LBRT: On balance, legal barriers to immigration are more harmful than beneficial to society.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

What Part of Legal Immigration Don’t You Understand?

Illustrated by Terry Cohn

SOURCE:
Immigration Overview

Immigration is the act of entering a country with the intention of permanently living and/or working there, although U.S. immigration laws also cover entry into the country for almost any purpose, including temporary stays beyond a certain length of time. Below is an overview of immigration processes in the United States.

Eligibility

The immigration system in the U.S. is set up primarily to grant immigration status based on factors such as family reunification, in-demand work skills, and capital investment. The immigration system also covers refugees and asylum seekers, and provides a "lottery" for immigration status to people who have less pressing immigration needs. The procedure for gaining legal immigrant status will depend upon, among other factors, which path you are eligible to pursue based on your employment, education, and family situation.

Family

If an individual is seeking immigrant status based on the fact that they have a relative who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, the following is required:

- The individual must be eligible for lawful permanent residence based on a family relationship that is recognized under U.S. immigration law. Not every relative is instantly eligible, and some immediate family members (spouses and children) are given preference over others.
- Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, must be filed by the individual's relative (called a "sponsor"), along with proof of the family relationship, and the petition must be approved by the government (the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services bureau).

Employment

If an individual is seeking immigrant status based on a permanent employment opportunity, the following is required:

- The individual must be eligible under one of the five categories of employment-based immigration recognized under U.S. law.
• The individual's employer must complete and submit a labor certification request (see Form ETA 750A and Form ETA 750B [must be submitted two-sided]) to the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration.
• The individual's employer must file an immigrant visa petition (usually Form I-140, Petition for Alien Worker) and the government must approve the petition.

Capital Investment

Although relatively rare, if an individual makes a qualifying capital investment in the United States, he or she may be eligible for immigrant status, provided that:
• The investment meets a certain threshold dollar amount, benefits the U.S. economy, and creates or saves a specific number of jobs.
• Form I-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur, is filed with and approved by the government.

Refugee

To be eligible for refugee status, an individual must have suffered past (or be in fear of future) persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political view, or membership in a certain group. An individual who is found eligible for refugee status must then satisfy certain medical and security criteria in order to be eligible for entry into the U.S. Political pressures make refugee status difficult to prove in some cases.

Diversity Lottery

Through the Diversity Visa Lottery Program, immigrant visas are made available annually to people whose country of origin has low immigration rates to the United States. Each year, the State Department selects 110,000 applicants from all qualified entries. However, once 50,000 immigrant visas are issued, or the fiscal year ends, the lottery is closed. Immigrant visas are not available for people whose country of origin sent more than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the last five years.

SOURCE:
http://immigration.findlaw.com/immigration-overview/immigration-overview.html
Historical Overview of Immigration Policy

Immigration has played an important role in American history, and the United States continues to have the most open immigration policy in the world. Before the era of rapid communications and transportation, America encouraged relatively open immigration to settle its empty lands. After certain states passed immigration laws following the Civil War, the Supreme Court in 1875 declared the regulation of immigration a federal responsibility. The Immigration Service was established in 1891 to deal with the big increase in immigration which started in 1880.

From 1900 to 1920, nearly 24 million immigrants arrived during what is known as the “Great Wave”. The outbreak of World War I reduced immigration from Europe, but mass immigration resumed upon the war's conclusion, and Congress responded with a new immigration policy: the national-origins quota system passed in 1921 and revised in 1924. Immigration was limited by assigning each nationality a quota based on its representation in past U.S. census figures. Also in 1924, Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol within the Immigration Service.

There was very little immigration over the next 20 years, with net immigration actually dropping below zero for several years during the Depression. Immigration remained relatively low during the 20 years following World War II, because the 1920s national-origins system remained in place after Congress re-codified and combined all previous immigration and naturalization law into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. American agriculture continued to import seasonal labor from Mexico, as they had during the war, under a 1951 formal agreement between the United States and Mexico that made the Bracero Program permanent.

In 1965, Congress replaced the national origins system with a preference system designed to unite immigrant families and attract skilled immigrants to the United States. This change to national policy responded to changes in the sources of immigration since 1924. The majority of applicants for immigration visas now came from Asia and Latin America rather than Europe. The preference system continued to limit the number of immigration visas available each year, however, and Congress still responded to refugees with special legislation. Not until the Refugee Act of 1980 did the United States have a general policy governing the admission of refugees.
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This legislation had two major facets: amnesty and enforcement. IRCA provided amnesty to aliens who had completed one of two stipulations: they had resided continually in the U.S. since January 1982 or they had completed 90 days of agricultural work between May 1985 and May 1986. The acceptance rate for amnesty applications was about 94 percent, eventually giving legal status to approximately 3 million. It is estimated that one-fourth of the cases accepted were fraudulent. In 2000, IRCA was extended through Late Amnesty, which allowed those fighting their original denial to reapply. As of June 2007, 15,000 Late Amnesty cases are still pending from IRCA. The 1986 legislation also contained enforcement provisions to prevent future illegal entry. The provisions prohibited the hiring and harboring of illegal aliens, but few resources were allocated to enforce these laws. Poor funding essentially tied the hands of enforcement officials. This created a lopsided ‘grand compromise’ that fueled later generations of illegal aliens.

In 1990, Congress again reformed immigration statutes. The 1990 Immigration Act modified and expanded the 1965 act; it significantly increased the total level of immigration to 700,000, increasing available visas 40 percent. The act retained family reunification as the major entry path, while more than doubling employment-related immigration. The law also provided for the admission of immigrants from “underrepresented” countries to increase the diversity of the immigrant flow by creating a lottery system. The 1990 Act also mandated a study of immigration, later known as the Jordan Commission.

The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, named after its Chairwoman, former Rep. Barbara Jordan, ran from 1990 to 1997. The Commission covered many facets of immigration policy, but started from the perception that the “credibility of immigration policy can be measured by a simple yardstick: people who should get in, do get in; people who should not get in, are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to leave.” From there, in a series of four reports, the commission looked at all aspects of immigration policy. In the first, it found that enforcement was lax and needed improvement on the border and internally. For internal enforcement, it recommended that an automated employment verification system be created to enable workers to distinguish between legal and illegal workers. The second report discussed legal immigration issues and suggested that immediate family members and skilled workers receive priority. The third report covered refugee and asylum issues. Finally, the fourth report reiterated the major points of the previous reports and the need for a new immigration policy. Few of these suggestions were implemented.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The act added to border controls by mandating the hiring of more Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Service agents. Repercussions for entering the country illegally were increased and a border fence was planned for San Diego. An automated employment verification pilot program was created in the hopes of easing worksite enforcement. The Act also allowed state police officers to enforce immigration law using the 287(g) program. Although the IIRIRA boosted de jure enforcement, poor funding again hindered the actual enforcement of the laws.

Also during the 1990s, a series of four smaller amnesties were passed. The first, the Section 245(i) amnesty, was passed in 1994 and pardoned approximately 578,000 illegal aliens, who were each fined $1,000. This amnesty was later renewed in 1997 and again in 2000. The second, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), was passed in 1997 and gave legal status to approximately one million illegal aliens, mostly from Central America, who had lived in the U.S. since 1995. In 1998, the Haitian Refugee Immigration and Fairness Act (HRIFA) passed after it was argued that excluding Haitians from NACARA was discriminatory. The most recent amnesty, passed in 2000, was the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE). The LIFE Act was a mini-amnesty aimed at those illegal aliens who hoped to become green card holders through marriage, employment or other categories, but who were not anywhere near approval yet, due to the long line of people ahead of them. It was sold as a way around the growing processing backlogs that were the result of previous amnesties. During the time of this legislation, from 1994 to 2000, millions of hopeful legal immigrants waited in line overseas.

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 affected perspectives on many issues, including immigration. A total of 20 foreign-born terrorists were involved, 19 of whom took part in the attack that caused 2,974 civilian deaths. The terrorists had entered the country on tourist or student visas. Four of them, however, had violated the terms of their visas and become illegal aliens. The attack exposed long-standing holes in our immigration system that included failures at visa processing, internal enforcement, and information sharing.

In 2006 the issue of immigration reform was once again discussed in Congress, with the House of Representatives and the Senate producing their own, conflicting bills. In December of 2005, the House passed the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which was sponsored by Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-WI).
act was limited to enforcement and focused on both the border and the interior. In the Senate, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA) was sponsored by Sen. Arlen Spector (R-PA) and passed in May 2006. CIRA would have given amnesty to a majority of illegal aliens already in the country as well as dramatically increased legal immigration. Although the bills passed their respective chambers, no compromise bill emerged.

In 2007, the Senate again attempted to pass amnesty legislation. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which would have given amnesty to a large majority of illegal entrants in the country, significantly increased legal immigration and increased enforcement. The act, which had bipartisan support in the Senate, was widely unpopular with the American public. As the result of unprecedented public pressure, the bill failed to pass a cloture vote, essentially killing it.

SOURCE:
http://cis.org/ImmigrationHistoryOverview
The Immigrant Visa Process

Foreign citizens who want to live permanently in the United States must first obtain an immigrant visa. This is the first step to becoming a lawful permanent resident.

Immigrating to the United States is an important and complex decision. In this section, you will learn about who may immigrate to the United States, the different types of immigrant visas, the required forms, and the steps in the immigrant visa process. Because most immigrants receive visas in the family or employment based visa categories, they are a key focus of this section. To be eligible to apply for an immigrant visa, a foreign citizen must be sponsored by a U.S. citizen relative, U.S. lawful permanent resident, or a prospective employer, with a few exceptions, explained below. The sponsor begins the immigration process by filing a petition on the foreign citizen’s behalf with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

Immigrating Based on Family

A U.S. citizen can file an immigrant visa petition for:
- Spouse
- Son or daughter
- Parent
- Brother or sister

A U.S. lawful permanent resident (that is, a green-card holder) can file an immigrant visa petition for:
- Spouse
- Unmarried son or daughter

As you get started:
- Learn more about Family Categories.
- To begin the immigration process, your sponsoring family member must file an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

Employment-Based Immigration

A U.S. employer can sponsor certain skilled workers who will be hired into permanent jobs. In some specialized fields, U.S. law allows prospective immigrants to sponsor themselves. In addition, U.S. law
provides a number of special immigrant categories, as well as an immigrant investor program.

As you get started:
- Learn more about Employment Categories
- To begin the immigration process, your sponsoring employer must file an I-140 Petition for Alien Worker with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In some categories, you can file the I-140 petition yourself.

Number of Visas Each Year is Limited in Some Categories

Regarding some of the immigrant visa categories, United States law limits the number of visas available each year, with certain limits by country. In these limited categories, whenever the number of qualified applicants exceeds the available immigrant visas, there will be a waiting list. In this situation, the available immigrant visas will be issued in the chronological order in which the petitions were filed. The date your petition was filed is called your priority date. You can learn more about priority dates.

Other Immigrant Visa Categories

Many immigrants receive visas in the family or employment based visa categories; however there are other immigrant visa categories. A U.S. citizen can also petition for the immigration of a foreign fiancé(e) to be married in the United States, or an orphan adopted abroad/to be adopted in the United States. Several immigrant visa categories that cover special types of workers or special circumstances are established by U.S. laws. (Learn more about special immigrant categories.) The United States also conducts an annual program for Diversity Visas. For these other visa categories, the immigrant process flow chart above does not apply; therefore, select from the category webpages under More Information above to learn how to apply in these visa categories.
1. Petition

2. Submit a Petition

3. After Your Petition is Approved

   - Check Priority Date
   - Begin National Visa Center (NVC) Processing
   - Pay Fees
   - Choose an Agent

4. Collect and Submit Forms and Documents to the NVC

   - Submit Visa Application Form
   - Collect Financial Documents
   - Collect Supporting Documents
   - Submit Documents to the NVC

5. Interview

6. After the Interview

   - Visa Applicant Interview
   - Prepare for the Interview
WHO'S INVOLVED
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
USCIS oversees immigration to the United States and approves (or denies) immigrant petitions and much more.

WHO'S INVOLVED
NATIONAL VISA CENTER
After petition approval, the National Visa Center (NVC) handles processing for certain kinds of documents, sending them onward to U.S. Embassies & consulates.

WHO'S INVOLVED
U.S. EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES
Review visa applications and documents, conduct interviews to determine eligibility for visas, and complete processing. They issue U.S. visas to eligible applicants.

After Your Petition is Approved

Collect and Submit Forms and Documents to the NVC

Interview
Coming to America for Entrepreneurs

It is no secret that some of Silicon Valley’s tech giants were founded by immigrants. Sergey Brin, a Russian emigrant, co-founded Google; Andrew Grove, originally from Hungary, co-founded Intel; both Steve Chen of YouTube and Jerry Yang of Yahoo came to the U.S. from Taiwan.

Immigrants continue to become some of the most successful founders in United States. Brazilian-born Mike Krieger moved to California in 2004 where he met future partner and fellow co-founder of Instagram. Danish co-founders Jon Froda and Anders Pollas created Podio in early 2009. Indonesian-born Malcolm Ong met his fellow co-founder, Michael Karnjanaprakorn, co-founded Skillshare while they both working at other startups.

How did they get here? And, most importantly, how can we get you here? There are more than a couple of ways.
Let’s start with the most optimal ways – the ways that ensure you get a green card.

Many Ways Of Coming to America

Option 1 Alien Investor – this is the EB-5 immigrant visa that asks you to invest $1 million in a U.S. business. If that business is in rural area, you only need to invest $500,000.

But what if you don’t have that kind of cash?

Option 2. EB-2 (C) visa — this is considered an “employment visa,” but under the (C) variety does not require you to have an employer. What you need is an advanced degree (masters and higher) or an exceptional ability in your field. Also, you will have to show that bringing you to the United States it is in the national interest of the United States.

What if you are so young that you don’t have exceptional abilities yet? You can still come in.

Option 3. E-2 Treaty Investors – do not worry, this time they will not ask you to invest a million. All you need to do is open a business in the U.S., invest at least $100,000 in it. You also need to be from a country that is on the list of treaty investors. A lot of countries are.

If your main asset is your talent, you have another option.

Option 4. O-1 visa is for people with exceptional abilities, including abilities in doing business. Say you wrote an app back home that got written up in magazines and someone famous reviewed it on YouTube? You can try for this type of visa. You will need a U.S. employer to sponsor you. Hopefully that employer is an amazing startup you want to work for.

Option 5. L1 visas. The first kind is the L1A – you need to be an executive or a top manager of a company that has offices in your country and in the U.S. You need to have worked at that foreign office for at least a year during that last three years. And they need to be sending you to the U.S. If the company does not have a U.S. office yet, you can be the one who opens it. the L1B kind is where you are not an executive, but you have some specialized knowledge. if the company sending you to the United States is not the one you ultimately want to work for, you will want to jump ship sooner or later. Many people have.
Option 6. H1B visa. This visa is for employees. There are a lot of requirements such as labor certifications, caps on the number of visas, etc. If you have i, but want to be an entrepreneur, use the time while you are on H1B to find the startup you actually want to work for.

Option 7. B-1 visa. This is a business visa. It is short-term, only 3-6 months. You can extend it once by another 6 months, totaling 12 months in the U.S. The downside is that you cannot work on this visa. But you can negotiate and network, etc.

If no other solution is available, B-1 is your way to come to America and then figure out the better way.

There are of course other options coming to America like J1, F1 but they are less than a straightforward way for an entrepreneur.

Things are changing quickly for entrepreneurs in America, for the better.

Update: Lastly, there is the Startup Visa, that is not an option yet, because it has not been passed as a law. As of December 1st, the current senate bill calls for a number of changes to immigration law. Among them, it would create a new type of visa allowing foreign-born entrepreneurs legally in the U.S. to stay if they can raise $100,000 in capital and hire at least two American workers during their first year holding the visa.

SOURCE: http://fundersandfounders.com/coming-to-america-for-entrepreneurs-infographic/
Free Movement in Europe: Past and Present
April 21, 2011

Citizens of the European Union are free to cross intra-European borders in search of work and education opportunities, a higher standard of living, or even a more desirable climate. Germans work in the finance sector in London and Luxembourg, young Lithuanians work in fast food restaurants in Ireland, Italians study in British universities, and Swedes retire in sunny Spain.

As an area of 27 countries with more than 500 million inhabitants, the European Union is currently the world’s best research laboratory on legal, transnational migration.

But how did such an area of free movement come about? Why did the sovereign states of Europe decide to give up one of the fundamental rights that defines a nation state — that of deciding who can cross its borders? And to what end?

This article provides a short overview of the history of the European free movement regime, and discusses how mobility in Europe has been promoted and utilized throughout the past 60 years, the EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007 and its impact on intra-European migration, and the challenges facing governments in this new era of EU mobility.

Post-War Economic Growth and Free Mobility

Over the past 60 years, Europe has undergone a shift from a region of net emigration to one of net immigration. During this time, a progressive lessening of restrictions on labor mobility between certain European countries has taken place.

In a way, this opening up of borders is a return to the past. Prior to the start of World War I in 1914, there were virtually no border controls or restrictions to labor mobility across the continent. During the war, however, the crossing of borders by foreigners began to be considered a security concern, and it was at this time that passports and visas were introduced in Europe.

Then in the 1950s, when Europe was beginning to recover from the devastation of World War II and experiencing a period of intense economic growth, labor mobility was again encouraged. Because the
lack of skilled workers was seen as a threat to the economy, freedom of movement of qualified industrial workers was included in the treaties founding the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the current European Union, in 1957.

Over 8 million work permits were issued to foreigners in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany (the original six members of the EEC) during the guest-worker period of 1958 to 1972. One-third of the foreign workers came from within the EEC; mainly from Italy, which was lagging behind in industrialization and suffered from high unemployment.

Workers were recruited through bilateral agreements from outside of Europe as well, especially to work in dirty, dangerous, and dull — the so-called 3D — jobs in the building, mining, and transportation sectors. Significant numbers of guest workers, for example, migrated from Turkey to Germany, from Algeria to France, and from the British Commonwealth countries to Britain.

The oil crisis that started in 1973 put an end to the open-doors policy regarding migrant workers, who were welcomed when the economy needed them but were expected to leave when times were hard. To the surprise of the host nations, however, most of the guest workers had come to stay. Moreover, many of these migrants had invited their families to join them in the destination countries, making family ties a more prominent cause for legal migration into Europe than active labor recruitment. This dilemma was neatly summarized by Swiss author Max Frisch: "We asked for workers, but human beings came."

Expanding Freedom of Movement: From Workers to Citizens

The right of free movement was initially intended for the economically active population: workers who were able to support themselves in the destination country. However, the texts of the founding treaties of the EEC, as well as the implementation of secondary legislation, left room for interpretation.

For years, European citizens have actively tested the boundaries of free mobility by challenging national administrative decisions in the European Court of Justice, which has played a fundamental role in widening the scope of free movement since the 1970s.

The rulings of the court since that time have gradually shifted policy from protecting primarily free movement of workers to the free movement of persons. In numerous individual cases, the court ruled that
a Member State of the EEC could not deny entry to or deport a citizen of another EEC state on the basis of personal conduct unless that conduct would warrant equally punitive action if it were undertaken by a citizen of the former state.

The very definition of "worker" was also gradually expanded to include not only workers in industry, but those in seasonal or short-term employment and apprenticeship placements in Member States as well. Then in 1990, freedom of movement came to be guaranteed for students, pensioners, and the unemployed, as well as for their families.

The process of establishing freedom of movement for all nationals of Member States was finalized with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the European Union (EU) and introduced the concept of a common European citizenship.

As the process of encouraging migration and easing travel restrictions continued, emphasis was placed on reducing border control formalities within Europe. The Schengen Agreement, which first went into effect in 1995, created a common, essentially borderless area between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, wherein travel credentials were only required at the external borders of this area.

Two years later, the Schengen rules were incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, and by 1999 European citizens were free to cross most intra-European borders without having to show their passports. As of this writing, the Schengen Area encompasses 25 European countries, three of which are not members of the European Union.

EU Expansion: The Mobility of Central and Eastern Europeans

In May 2004, the 15 states of the European Union (EU-15) welcomed ten new Member States in what was the largest expansion in the history of European integration.

The new Member States included eight countries (also called the A-8) from the other side of the former Iron Curtain: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had still been part of the Soviet Union just 13 years earlier. At the same time, membership was granted to the island states of Cyprus and Malta.

The enlargement was the target of much controversy, as media estimates of the potential wave of economically motivated migration
from the Central and Eastern European countries varied from 5 million to 40 million people. The rate of migration was estimated to be high because differences in income and the standard of living between the new Member States and the EU-15 were large: in 2003, the average wage in Latvia — the poorest among the new Member States — was just one-eighth of the average wage in the EU-15.

Although previous enlargements of the European Union had not resulted in major outflows of workers from new Member States, this time was thought to be different. It was feared that unlimited labor migration from the A-8 would cause serious problems for the labor markets of the EU-15. Similar fears related to wage dumping and potential "welfare tourism" to the EU-15 were expressed again when Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union in 2007.

During the accession negotiations, a transitional period of seven years was established so that each old Member State could determine when it was ready to open its borders to workers from the new Member States. The transitional measures were based on a "2+3+2 model," where the restrictions on labor market entry of new citizens had to be reviewed after two years, and again three years later. A final two-year phase of restrictions was permitted only in cases of serious disturbances within the individual labor markets of the EU-15. (The restrictions did not apply to the citizens of Cyprus and Malta.)

Free movement between all Member States was thus to be guaranteed by May 2011 at the latest for the citizens of the countries that joined in 2004, and by January 2014 for citizens of Bulgaria and Romania.

Only three Member States — Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom — decided to open their borders immediately, the former two mainly because their growing and relatively open economies needed labor, and the latter because its regulated labor market was believed to be able to maintain wages at the collectively agreed upon levels.

Moreover, immigration at that time was not perceived as such a significant threat in these countries, as opposed to in France, for example, where a fictional character named the "Polish Plumber" was used to fuel fears on how skilled French workers were soon to be replaced by a flood of Eastern Europeans willing to work for less.

Around 70 percent of migrants from the A-8 have since headed for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Migrants from Bulgaria and Romania, on the other hand, have mostly chosen to go to Italy and Spain.
After the 2004 expansion, Poland was the source of the largest number of migrant workers among all new Member States. In fact, the number of Poles "temporarily residing" in another EU Member State more than doubled between 2004 and 2007, peaking at around 2 million — at that time a remarkable 5.3 percent of the country’s total population of 38 million. Lithuania, however, had the largest number of outgoing migrants relative to the size of its labor force, and some areas of the country have suffered from at least a temporary, yet very visible, youth drain.

In general, the unique histories, cultures, economic situations, and government policies in each new Member State seem to have influenced the number of outgoing migrants. For some countries, joining the European Union did not significantly increase outward migration. Hungary, where regional mobility within the country itself and interest in working abroad has been traditionally low, is one such case.

Despite the transitional measures adopted by some countries — Austria and Germany, the only two old Member States that chose to limit the entry of A-8 workers until May 2011, in particular — and the other various restrictions on labor market access that were put in place, workers from the new Member States in temporary, self-employment, or informal-sector positions retained their mobility.

Visa restrictions for citizens from Eastern European countries planning travel to the EU-15 had been lifted in 2001, so de facto labor mobility was already taking place before the new Member States officially joined the European Union and well before the transitional periods were over. Evidence of this fact comes from the Worker Registration Scheme implemented by the United Kingdom as a measure to monitor post-enlargement migrants. In the six months following the May 2004 enlargement, about 30 percent of the applications to the Scheme came from people who had already been living in the United Kingdom prior to the enlargement.

Intra-European Migrants

As the transitional period limiting free movement from Bulgaria and Romania comes to an end by January 2014, Europe will form an area where citizens from 31 countries — the 27 countries of the European Union (EU-27) plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland — can live, study, or work anywhere they wish. Crossing borders within this area has been made incredibly simple by policy, technology, the travel industry, and globalization.
But this reality presents a key problem for those studying European mobility: many forms of cross-border movement within this area remain uncounted by official statistics. European citizens cross borders unregistered, often remain essentially invisible in their destination countries, and are counted differently depending on their countries of origin and destination. In the United Kingdom, for example, the measurement of immigration relies mainly on the number of residents who were born abroad, while in other countries, such as Germany, it is determined by the number of residents who are not national citizens.

Statistics of emigrants are not clear cut either: Austrians are categorized as emigrants when they leave their country for more than three months, Belgians after six months, Finns if they intend to stay abroad for more than a year, and Poles and Romanians only if they indicate that they are leaving for good.

Due to the high degree of variance in policy across countries, citizenship is also not a reliable way to account for mobility. Belgium, for instance, requires three years of residence before citizenship can be granted, while Austria demands a minimum stay of ten years. Children born to foreign citizens are foreigners themselves in some countries, such as in Sweden and Finland, but can automatically become citizens of their country of birth in others, such as in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

For these reasons, statistics on how many intra-European migrants live in any particular Member State at any given time must be taken with a grain of salt. There are, however, some informative and relevant data.

The Overall Size of the Population

In Eurobarometer surveys, freedom of movement within the EU-27 is often seen as the best achievement of the European Union, ranking above the euro, economic prosperity, or even peace. Yet, to the disappointment of the European Commission, which is concerned about economic growth and labor flexibility, European citizens have been rather slow in utilizing this right.

Within the EU-15, levels of intra-European mobility have stayed relatively stable. The majority of foreign workers have continued to come from outside the European Union, and the share of mobile EU nationals has remained lower than it had been during the days of the guest-worker era of the 1960s.
In 2000, about 5.1 percent of the total EU-15 population, or 19 million people, lived in a country of which they were not a citizen. The majority of these foreign citizens lived in Germany (37.0 percent), France (18.4 percent), and the United Kingdom (10.2 percent). Only about 6 million of the foreign citizens (16 percent) living in the European Union in 2000 were nationals of another EU Member State, and the majority of them also lived in Germany (19 million), France (12 million), and the United Kingdom (860,000).

According to EUROSTAT, the statistical office of the European Union, 319 million foreign citizens lived in the EU-27 in 2009, comprising 6.4 percent of the total EU-27 population. About one-third, or 119 million, were citizens of another EU-27 Member State.

The effects of the eastward enlargements of 2004 and 2007 are visible, not only in the overall figures for 2009, but also when it is considered that the two largest national groups in the EU mobile population were those of Romania (2.0 million EU migrants) and Poland (1.5 million EU migrants). Together, these two groups accounted for 11 percent of all foreign citizens living in the EU-27 in 2009. Turkey, a candidate for future EU membership, had the largest share of migrants living within the EU-27 when compared with all non-EU and EU countries (2.4 million).

The proportion of foreign citizens living in each country varied from less than 1 percent in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria to 44 percent in Luxembourg. In terms of numbers, Germany, again, hosted the largest share of foreign nationals in the EU-27 (2.5 million) followed by Spain (2.3 million), the United Kingdom (16 million), France (13 million), and Italy (11 million).

Characteristics of Intra-European Migrants in the EU-15

The most extensive effort undertaken so far to understand intra-EU migration was the Pioneers of European Integration (PIONEUR) research project, which took place between 2003 and 2006.

The project targeted movers between the five most populous EU-15 Member States — Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain — and used the European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) in 2004 to collect information on the experiences of nearly 5,000 Europeans who had moved from one of these countries to another. Because intra-European migrants are not easily traced from population registers, the survey used an objective name-based telephone directory sampling technique to reach this population.
The survey revealed four general migrant types in the EU-15: late-traditional migrants who continue the old south-north labor migration patterns, retirement migrants who move from north to south, middle-aged preretirement migrants, and a class of highly mobile young European professionals.

For the Europeans of the EIMSS survey, economic considerations or differences in wage levels were not as prominent of motives for moving as traditional economic theories of migration might suggest. In fact, the most common reasons stated for mobility were related to love and family: "to live with partner/spouse/children" got the absolute highest share of responses at 29.7 percent. The second-most important reasons were related to lifestyle and the environment: "to live in a better natural environment" garnered 15.7 percent of responses, followed by "to live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate" with 13.5 percent. Among the economic or work-related motivations for moving, "to accept a job offer" got the highest share of responses at 15.2 percent.

The PIONEUR project revealed that European migration, at least between the EU-15, has changed over the years from mainly involving less skilled economic migrants in blue-collar occupations towards the mobility of the educated and highly skilled, who often come from upper- or upper-middle-class families.

Looking Forward

When the free movement regime was initiated 60 years ago, it was intended to encourage blue-collar workers to cross borders for temporary employment in the industrial sector. Now, a wide variety of Europeans utilize this right.

In 2009, Eurobarometer surveyed 27,000 individuals from the EU-27 on their mobility experiences and intentions. The report, released in 2010, indicates that EU citizens from the more recently incorporated Member States are more likely to be motivated to work abroad and choose their country of destination based on economic considerations, while those from the EU-15 are more likely to consider lifestyle and cultural factors in their decisions to migrate. These findings reinforce the EIMSS survey findings from about five years earlier.

It seems that, at least for now, two diverging mobility patterns coexist in the current European context, and that these two groups are frequently viewed in somewhat different terms based on the reasons for their migration: more affluent EU-15 migrants are often described as
“mobile Europeans,” while those coming from the new Member States are referred to as "immigrants," and may face discrimination regardless of their EU-citizenship status.

Member State governments, for example, struggle with finding ways to manage public frustration related to the Roma population in a way that is compatible with EU legislation and universal human rights.

Thousands of Roma, pushed from Romania, Bulgaria, and other countries of Eastern Europe by poverty and discrimination, live in illegal camps at the outskirts of large Western and Northern European cities. In the summer of 2010, France caused an international outcry by dismantling numerous Roma settlements and expelling those who occupied them, despite the fact these individuals were EU citizens with the protected right of free mobility.

But Europeans are not the only population that utilizes the right to free movement within Europe. Once within the borders of the European Union and the Schengen area, third-country nationals also benefit from free mobility in practice — regardless of whether they have permission to legally reside or work in other countries — because of the lack of internal border checks. The implications of this reality, together with the contemporary challenges facing Europe's external borders, have placed significant stress on free movement.

Greece's recent border security travails and the concern on the part of some Member States that Bulgaria and Romania will become porous entry points into the European Union once they join the Schengen area are ready examples of such challenges. In addition, the recent uprisings in North Africa and the subsequent arrival of migrants from conflict-embroiled countries to Italy and Malta have fueled the debate surrounding free mobility, and have led some governments to question the fairness of a system that allows countries situated at the external boundaries of Europe to bear the brunt of border-control responsibilities.

Free mobility and the Schengen system are not static concepts, and the relationships upon which they are predicated will continue to evolve. While not likely to impinge on the overarching principle and practice of freedom of movement within Europe, it is possible that contemporary developments will continue to test solidarity and trust between Member States.

PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS

PRO ARGUMENTS

PRO: Prevent overall economic growth

Immigrants have a big positive impact on the economy, bolstering the profitability of American firms, reducing the prices of some products and services by providing employers with a new labor source and creating more opportunities for investment and jobs. An economist estimated that the wave of immigrants that entered the United States from 1990 to 2007 increased national income per worker by about $5,400 a year on average, in 2007 dollars. He also concluded that the wave had a small positive impact on the average wage of American workers, by lifting the overall economy.

PRO: Prevent positive impact on employment and wages

Immigrants and native-born workers generally do not compete for the same jobs; instead, many immigrants complement the work native-born employees and increase their productivity. For example, low-skilled immigrant laborers allow native-born farmers, contractors, and craftsmen to expand agricultural production or to build more homes—thereby expanding employment possibilities and incomes for citizens. Immigrants help native-born workers in by opening stores, restaurants, or production facilities to take advantage of the added supply of workers; more workers translate into more business.

PRO: Deter ‘brain gain’

Brain gain is defined as an increase in the number of highly trained, foreign-born professionals entering a country to live and work. Countries with strict legal barriers to immigration and a system mired in political dysfunction, highly skilled workers with valuable training and education in search of a better future end up in other countries who are waging an aggressive global competition for highly skilled professionals.
PRO: Hinder population decline solution

The **perfect demographic storm** of comparatively high mortality, low fertility and emigration of well-educated professionals is increasingly burdening society and its deteriorating economy. In addition to a shrinking labor force, mounting costs for its **aging population** and troubling premature deaths, especially among men, difficulties in filling critical jobs with largely unskilled migrants need to be addressed by **lifting strict legal barriers to immigration**.

PRO: Prevent humanitarian protection for refugees and asylum seekers

There is a **current policy** in place that does not accept applications from people with the intention to seek asylum and will not be considered legal entry. In fact, these people will be taken to another island where their application will be processed staying in refugee camps without a chance of ever reaching their destination. There have been **reports** of a number of violations in these camps making it unsafe and inhumane for anyone to stay. In **Europe**, countries that were overwhelmed by the recent wave of refugee seekers responded by putting up razor wires and tightening border patrols. They implemented new policies that would result to deportation and jail time. Those refugees and asylum seekers who have been rejected and denied entry will try their luck by other, often **dangerous, routes**.
CON ARGUMENTS

CON: Keep local jobs to natives

Less-skilled natives earn less money and have fewer job opportunities because they must compete with immigrants in the job market. Despite the improving economy, millions of citizens are out of work and unemployment is high. Whether it's lack of skills or lack of opportunities, many of those citizens will be forced to take the low-paying unskilled jobs. Arrival of millions of new workers seeking jobs decreases the amount of work available.

CON: Prevents ‘brain drain’

Brain drain is the migration of skilled human resources for trade, education, etc. Trained health professionals are needed in every part of the world. However, better standards of living and quality of life, higher salaries, access to advanced technology and more stable political conditions in the developed countries attract talent from less developed areas. The sending countries have invested in the education and training of young health professionals. This translates into a loss of considerable resources when their people migrate, with the direct benefit accruing to the receiving countries who have not forked out the cost of educating them. The intellectuals of any country are some of the most expensive resources because of their training in terms of material cost and time, and most importantly, because of lost opportunity.

CON: Government will save more on welfare

In 2012, 51 percent of households headed by an immigrant reported that they used at least one welfare program during the year, compared to 30 percent of native households. Welfare in this study includes Medicaid and cash, food, and housing programs. All immigrant-headed households receive an average of $6,241 in welfare, 41 percent more than native households. As with Americans receiving benefits such as food stamps and cash, much of the welfare to immigrants supplements their low wage jobs.

CON: Keep criminals and terrorists outside the borders
The 19 terrorists of September 11 were foreign citizens and most entered the United States legally as tourists, business travelers, or students. Any additional opportunities to enter the country only increase the chances for terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals to expand their enterprises. One indicator that the United States has lost control of its southwest border is the ease with which thousands of tons of drugs and millions of illegal aliens are crossing the U.S. border on an annual basis. This open borders policy has opened the door to millions of undocumented persons to provide a perfect cover for various forms of criminal activity, ranging from drug trafficking to prostitution to identity theft.

**CON: Immigrants do not integrate causing societal discord**

Some immigrant communities are segregated in ghettos with little or no social interaction that breeds distrust. They have values and norms that are simply inconsistent with the values of the native-born citizens thus finding it difficult to integrate. They pass this on to their children that makes it harder for the next generation to find a place in the society. According to one survey, two-thirds of immigrant children still can't read adequately at the end of their fourth year in school. The situation is especially bad in big cities with high proportions of immigrants.
**TIMELINE**

**Key Dates and Landmarks in United States Immigration History**

1789  The Constitution of the United States of America takes effect, succeeding the Articles of Confederation that had governed the union of states since the conclusion of the Revolutionary War (March 4, 1789).

1790  The Naturalization Act of 1790 establishes a uniform rule of naturalization and a two-year residency requirement for aliens who are "free white persons" of "good moral character" (March 26, 1790).

1798  Considered one of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Naturalization Act of 1798 permits Federalist President John Adams to deport foreigners deemed to be dangerous and increases the residency requirements to 14 years to prevent immigrants, who predominantly voted for the Republican Party, from becoming citizens (June 25, 1798).

1802  The Jefferson Administration revises the Naturalization Act of 1798 by reducing the residency requirement from 14 to five years.

1808  Importation of slaves into the United States is officially banned, though it continues illegally long after the ban.

1819  Congress passes an act requiring shipmasters to deliver a manifest enumerating all aliens transported for immigration. The Secretary of State is required to report annually to Congress the number of immigrants admitted.

1821-1830  143,439 immigrants arrive

1831-1840  599,125 immigrants arrive

1840s  Crop failures in Germany, social turbulence triggered by the rapid industrialization of European society, political unrest in Europe, and the Irish Potato Famine (1845–1851) lead to a new period of mass immigration to the United States.

1841-1850  173,251 immigrants arrive

1848  The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ends the Mexican-American War and extends citizenship to the approximately 80,000 Mexicans living in Texas, California, and the American Southwest.
1848  Gold is discovered in the American River, near Sacramento, California.

1849  The California gold rush spurs immigration from China and extensive internal migration.

1850  For the first time, the United States Census surveys the "nativity" of citizens (born inside or outside the US).

1851-1860  **2,598,214 immigrants arrive**

1854  The Know-Nothings, a nativist political party seeking to increase restrictions on immigration, win significant victories in Congress, a sign of popular dissatisfaction with growing immigration from Catholic Ireland. Protestant Americans feared that growing Catholic immigration would place American society under control of the Pope.

1855  Castle Garden is established as New York's principal point of entry.

1861-1870  **2,314,825 immigrants arrive**

1861  Outbreak of the American Civil War (April 12, 1861).

1862  The Homestead Act provides free plots of up to 160 acres of western land to settlers who agree to develop and live on it for at least five years, thereby spurring an influx of immigrants from overpopulated countries in Europe seeking land of their own.

1862  The "Anti-Coolie" Act discourages Chinese immigration to California and institutes special taxes on employers who hire Chinese workers.

1863  Riots against the draft in New York City involve many immigrants opposed to compulsory military service (July 13–16, 1863).

1863  The Central Pacific hires Chinese laborers and the Union Pacific hires Irish laborers to construct the first transcontinental railroad, which would stretch from San Francisco to Omaha, allowing continuous travel by rail from coast to coast.

1869  The First Transcontinental Railroad is completed when the Central Pacific and Union Pacific lines meet at Promontory Summit, Utah (May 10, 1869).

1870  The Naturalization Act of 1870 expands citizenship to both whites and African-Americans, though Asians are still
1870 The Fifteenth Amendment is ratified, granting voting rights to citizens, regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

1870 Jacob Riis, who later pioneered photojournalism and authored *How the Other Half Lives*, emigrates from Denmark to the United States.

1871-1880 2,812,191 immigrants arrive

1881-1890 5,246,613 immigrants arrive

1881-1885 1 million Germans arrive in the peak of German immigration

1881-1920 2 million Eastern European Jews immigrate to the United States

1882 The Chinese Exclusion Act restricts all Chinese immigration to the United States for a period of ten years.

1882 The Immigration Act of 1882 levies a tax of 50 cents on all immigrants landing at US ports and makes several categories of immigrants ineligible for citizenship, including "lunatics" and people likely to become public charges.

1885 The Alien Contract Labor Law prohibits any company or individual from bringing foreigners into the United States under contract to perform labor. The only exceptions are those immigrants brought to perform domestic service and skilled workmen needed to help establish a new trade or industry in the US.

1886 The Statue of Liberty is dedicated in New York Harbor.

1886 Emma Goldman, Lithuanian-born feminist, immigrates to the United States, where over the next 30 years she will become a prominent American anarchist. During the First World War, in 1917, she is deported to Russia for conspiring to obstruct the draft.

1889 Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr found Hull-House in Chicago.

1890 The demographic trends in immigration to the United States shift as immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe substantially increases, while the relative proportion of immigration from Northern and Western Europe begins to decrease.
1891-1900 3,687,564 immigrants arrive.

1891 Congress makes "persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease," those convicted of a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude," and polygamists ineligible for immigration. Congress also establishes the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration within the Treasury Department.

1892 The Geary Act extends the Chinese Exclusion Act for ten more years, and adds the requirement that all Chinese residents carry permits, as well as excluding them from serving as witnesses in court and from bail in habeus corpus proceedings.

1892 Ellis Island, the location at which more than 16 million immigrants would be processed, opens in New York City.

1901-1910 8,795,386 immigrants arrive

1901 After President William McKinley is shot by a Polish anarchist (September 6, 1901) and dies a week later (September 14, 1901), Congress enacts the Anarchist Exclusion Act, which prohibits the entry into the US of people judged to be anarchists and political extremists.

1902 The Chinese Exclusion Act is again renewed, with no ending date.

1906 The Naturalization Act of 1906 standardizes naturalization procedures, makes some knowledge of the English language a requirement for citizenship, and establishes the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in the Commerce Department to oversee national immigration policy.

1907 The Expatriation Act declares that an American woman who marries a foreign national loses her citizenship.

1907 Under an informal "Gentlemen's Agreement," the United States agrees not to restrict Japanese immigration in exchange for Japan's promise to voluntarily restrict Japanese emigration to the United States by not issuing passports to Japanese laborers. In return, the US promises to crack down on discrimination against Japanese-Americans, most of whom live in California.

1907 The Dillingham Commission is established by Congress to investigate the effects of immigration on the United States.
1911–1920 2 million Italians arrive in the peak of Italian immigration
1911–1920 5,735,811 immigrants arrive
1911 The Dillingham Commission, established in 1907, publishes a 42-volume report warning that the "new" immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe threatens to subvert American society. The Dillingham Commission's recommendations lay the foundation for the Quota Acts of the 1920s.
1913 California's Alien Land Law prohibits "aliens ineligible for citizenship" (Chinese and Japanese) from owning property in the state, providing a model for similar anti-Asian laws in other states.
1917 Congress enacts a literacy requirement for immigrants by overriding President Woodrow Wilson's veto. The law requires immigrants to be able to read 40 words in some language and bans immigration from Asia, except for Japan and the Philippines.
1917 The US enters the First World War.
1917 The Immigration Act of 1917 restricts immigration from Asia by creating an "Asiatic Barred Zone."
1917 The Jones-Shafroth Act grants US citizenship to Puerto Ricans, provided that they can be recruited by the US military.
1919 The First Red Scare leads to an outbreak of fear and violence against people deemed to be political radicals and foreigners considered to be susceptible to communist propaganda and more likely to be involved in the Bolshevik Revolution.
1921–1930 4,107,209 immigrants arrive.
1921 The Emergency Quota Act restricts immigration from a given country to 3% of the number of people from that country living in the US in 1910.
1922 The Cable Act partially repeals the Expatriation Act, but declares that an American woman who marries an Asian still loses her citizenship.
1923 In the landmark case of United States v. Bhaghat Singh Thind, the Supreme Court rules that Indians from the Asian subcontinent cannot become US citizens.
1924 The Immigration Act of 1924 limits annual European
immigration to 2% of the number of people from that country living in the United States in 1890. The Act greatly reduces immigration from Southern and Eastern European nationalities that had only small populations in the US in 1890.

1924 The Oriental Exclusion Act prohibits most immigration from Asia, including foreign-born wives and the children of American citizens of Chinese ancestry.

1924 The Border Patrol is created to combat smuggling and illegal immigration.

1929 The National Origins Formula institutes a quota that caps national immigration at 150,000 and completely bars Asian immigration, though immigration from the Western Hemisphere is still permitted.

1931-1940 532,431 immigrants arrive.

1933 To escape persecution by the Nazis, Albert Einstein, the greatest theoretical physicist of the century, immigrates to the United States from Germany.

1934 The Tydings-McDuffe Act grants the Philippines independence from the United States on July 4, 1946, but strips Filipinos of US citizenship and severely restricts Filipino immigration to the United States.

1940 The Alien Registration Act requires the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens in the United States over the age of 14.

SOURCE:
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/immigration/timeline.html
ARTICLE 1

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRATION
BY: Sebastian Mallaby
SOURCE: Foreign Affairs
September 28, 2015

To understand the economic stakes in Europe's refugee crisis, start in an unlikely place: the South Pacific island of Tonga. In 2006, the World Bank brokered a deal between this impoverished microstate and nearby New Zealand. Tonga would satisfy New Zealand's unmet need for fruit pickers by sending some of its citizens to its wealthy neighbor; New Zealand would provide those citizens with employment. The experiment increased the income of participating Tongan workers by a factor of ten, an effect that dwarfed the potential benefit of any imaginable aid program. With this extraordinary leap in income came improvements in everything from the quality of workers' homes to the school performance of their children. The program cost New Zealand nothing.

As in Tonga, so in Europe and across the world: the cross-border movement of people can boost prosperity more powerfully than other forms of globalization. Trade liberalization can expand countries' output by a few percentage points—worth having, to be sure, but generally not transformative. International capital flows can in principle improve the allocation of the world's savings, but they can also misfire, triggering crises. Migration, in contrast, can generate vast increases in living standards. “The gains to eliminating [migration] barriers amount to large fractions of world GDP,” the development scholar Michael Clemens has argued, that are “one or two orders of magnitude larger than the gains from dropping all remaining restrictions on international flows of goods and capital.”

If the gains from migration are so vast, why do political leaders tend to resist new arrivals? The answer lies in the distribution of these gains, the lion's share of which accrues to the migrants. If a cabdriver from Lima moves to New York, for instance, his skills will remain unchanged, but his income will shoot up dramatically. Yet the economic consequences for New York and for its native-born cabdrivers will not be immediately obvious, and the impact of the migrant’s new job on the Peruvian economy will be hard to assess.
Seen from the standpoint of global welfare, in other words, migration offers a clear win. But politicians speak for national and sometimes regional interests, not for the global commons. It is perhaps for this reason that European leaders have struggled to respond to a crisis that, properly managed, could greatly increase the global total of well-being.

A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION

A large economics literature has sought to untangle migration’s national and regional impacts. From the point of view of countries from which migrants emigrate, the findings are mixed, but probably more positive than most people imagine. For one thing, emigrants from developing countries remit around $440 billion annually to relatives at home, a transfer that is three times the size of total official development aid worldwide. For another, the loss of productive workers may be less crippling to countries of origin than is frequently assumed. It is often asserted, for example, that Africa’s health services have suffered grievously from the exodus of trained nurses and doctors from the continent. But African countries with the largest outflows of physicians as a share of total population, such as Algeria, Ghana, or South Africa, tend to have the lowest rates of child mortality; apparently, enough doctors and nurses stay behind to prevent a breakdown. Likewise, it is easy to lament that Greece’s bankrupt economy has been irreparably damaged by the brain drain of educated twenty-somethings. But Greece has an unemployment rate of 25 percent, and its economy was hardly benefiting from young people who weren’t working. Migrants, in other words, tend to leave places where productive opportunities are meager, and even as they leave, enough workers tend to stay behind to fill those opportunities that remain. Clearly, it would be grotesque to oppose the flood of Syrians to Europe on grounds of an alleged loss to Syria’s economy.

For receiving countries, meanwhile, the verdict on migration is even more favorable. A good example of the benefits is to be found in the United Kingdom—despite the fact that many Britons deeply resent immigrants. Contrary to popular mythology, the United Kingdom’s immigrants are, on average, better educated, more productive, and less of a burden on public services than native-born citizens. Almost half of the British-born work force left school at 16 or younger; fewer than one in five foreign-born workers abandoned the classroom so early. At the other end of the spectrum, 46 percent of recent immigrants to the United Kingdom in 2005 stayed in education until age 21 or beyond; only 16 percent of native Britons were as well educated. Meanwhile, just over a third of British residents are either too young or too old to work and pay taxes, whereas the vast majority of migrants are in the prime of
their productive years. In London, where 37 percent of residents were born abroad, migrants account for fully 60 percent of the labor force in parts of the city.

Migrants, then, boost output and are net contributors to the United Kingdom’s public finances. But do they nonetheless harm low-skilled native workers by flooding the labor market and depressing wages? At first glance, this is a plausible story: migrants often compete for low-skilled jobs despite having good educational qualifications. But studies in the United Kingdom and in the United States have shown that migrants do surprisingly little to depress wages for low-skilled native workers. One reason may be that low-skilled natives can shift into occupations that place a premium on English-language skills, for which migrants represent limited competition. Another may be that workers compete not just with one another but also with machines, so that when migrants swell the labor force, businesses spend less on automation and hire more workers. The supply of jobs thus rises to match the increased pool of job seekers, and wages remain more or less unaltered.

The positive impacts of migration on host economies, meanwhile, tend to be underappreciated because they are tricky to measure. As the economist Jonathan Portes has argued, migrants bring new ideas and methods, offering native-born workers opportunities to learn and adapt. They increase competition for jobs, spurring natives to acquire new skills and to stay in the educational system longer. Evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States suggests that migrants are more likely to register patents than natives; even more striking, migrants’ success in this respect spurs natives to register more patents, too. By enriching and diversifying the supply of labor and by sharpening competitive incentives, immigration can boost productivity across host economies.

THE REFUGEE BOON

It is fair to be skeptical of the relevance of such findings for Europe’s current crisis, because economic migrants and refugees differ in important aspects. Economic migrants uproot themselves specifically to work and are taken in by host states because their skills are needed, so they can be expected to contribute significantly to host economies. In contrast, states take in refugees to advance humanitarian rather than economic goals. Yet despite these reasons to suspect that refugees may burden economies, the best evidence suggests that, like economic migrants, they are a boon to host states—even if domestic opinion does not always see them that way.
Consider a natural experiment in Denmark. Starting in the early 1990s, Denmark took in refugees from countries such as Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia, boosting the share of non-EU migrants in the population from around 1.5 percent in 1994 to 4.7 percent in 2008. The officials in charge of this asylum program paid no heed to the skills, education, or job preferences of migrants, nor did they consider the skill gaps in the regions of Denmark to which the refugees were allocated. Rather, they settled people according to where public housing was available and later according to the location of their relatives. At least two-fifths of the newcomers lacked postsecondary education, few spoke Danish, and many came from cultures very distant from northern Europe’s. If an influx of outsiders was ever going to damage a host country’s economy, here surely was a ripe example.

Remarkably, this damage did not materialize. A 2013 working paper by Mette Foged of the University of Copenhagen and Giovanni Peri of the University of California, Davis, considered the impact of this influx, particularly on one of Denmark’s most vulnerable groups: its low-skilled native workers. Foged and Peri’s study found that the influx of migrants to Denmark had no negative impact on wages. Instead, as refugees came in, low-skilled native-born workers shifted into different jobs, sometimes using their command of Danish to differentiate themselves from the newcomers. What is more, the number of low-skilled jobs in the economy increased: proof that humans can sometimes substitute for machines, in a reversal of the familiar teleology. Because of these adaptations, the wages and job prospects of low-skilled native workers either improved or stayed the same.

The Danish study is especially striking because it disposes of the standard objection to the optimistic view of the economic effects of migration, which is that migrants harm native workers in ways that are invisible to researchers. Earlier studies from the United States had tracked the response of native wages to migration in particular towns, finding that wages of low-skilled workers in places with high migration rose roughly as fast as in those with low migration. Critics of those studies, however, objected that natives who suffered job losses might move, thereby disappearing from the sample. But Denmark’s workers are tracked nationally, no matter where they go, as are their fluctuating work fortunes. The positive verdict from the Danish study is all the more powerful because it held up even under this comprehensive tracking.

Given this result, could today’s European Union accept large numbers of refugees without paying an economic price for doing so? In one sense, the answer is yes: Denmark’s influx of refugees, amounting to three
percent of its population, is proportionally equivalent to the 500 million–strong European Union taking in 15 million asylum seekers, a large multiple of any figure currently under consideration. Admittedly, the Danish influx occurred over 14 years, but the equivalent for the European Union would still be over one million arrivals per year, which is probably more than today’s supposedly unmanageable influx. The numbers on current refugee inflows are sketchy, but the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reports that there were 437,000 asylum applications in the EU during the first seven months of this year, not all of which will be accepted. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for its part, estimates that as many as one million people could apply for asylum in Europe during 2015, with up to 450,000 likely to be accepted. Not only could one million or so migrants be absorbed annually: given the EU’s graying population, an influx of relatively young foreigners could be a huge asset.

And yet Europe faces three bedeviling problems. Its ability to productively absorb migrants is limited by high unemployment, low growth, and inflexible labor markets. Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States share relatively low barriers to hiring and firing, which facilitate the shuffling of the work force: if migrants enjoy a comparative advantage in construction or cabdriving, natives quickly gravitate to clerical work and shopkeeping. Yet many European countries, such as Italy and France, lack this adaptability because of a thicket of restrictive employment rules. As a result, these states are bound to struggle with sudden shifts in the composition of their work forces. Europe’s hesitancy in the face of the migrant challenge reflects its larger economic weaknesses.
TIGHT IMMIGRATION LAWS MAKING COUNTRIES LESS COMPETITIVE, SAYS THINK TANK

BY: Arturo Bris and José Caballero
SOURCE: Training Journal
November 2, 2015

With floods of migrants pouring out of the Middle East and a simmering debate about immigration in Europe, politicians and the public should make sure not to throw the baby out with the bath water when formulating policies. Immigration can have some very positive effects and one of our recent IMD Competitiveness Center studies backs this up.

Competitiveness greatly depends on the extent to which governments facilitate an environment conducive to business. One key indicator is the impact of immigration laws; that is, whether or not immigration laws curtail the ability of enterprises to conduct their activities effectively.

A large survey of senior executives, carried out for the IMD World Competitiveness Center’s recently released IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, shows that decision-makers at companies view nations with strict immigration regulation as less competitive and lower on talent.

From 2014 to 2015 Germany, Malaysia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have clamped down on immigration. At the same time data shows that executives perceive that these countries have experienced a decline in the availability of skilled labour and senior managers with significant international experience.

Because of this, the business leaders say, the business environment in Germany and Malaysia has lost attractiveness for highly-skilled foreigners who can contribute to boosting company performance. Switzerland and the United Kingdom did not lose attractiveness for the executives according to the survey, however.

Conversely, executives indicate that in the same period while Qatar has ‘relaxed’ its immigration policies that the country has experienced
improvements in the availability of skilled and competent workers, and that its attractiveness has increased.

The survey tells a different story for Mexico. Despite stricter immigration policies, executives indicate that the country has improved its availability of skills and competencies and that the country remains attractive to highly-skilled international talent.

Increasingly strict immigration policy also affects productivity according to the participants. Executives say that in Germany, Malaysia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, workforce productivity (by international standards) declined during 2014 and 2015. The executives’ perceptions applied to both large corporations and small to medium-sized enterprises, with the exception of the UK, where SME’s were seen to be becoming more efficient. In both Mexico and Qatar productivity indicators improved, according to the survey.

While the survey measures perception and not “hard data”, perception is important because if decision makers at a company favour a location over another, there can be implications for job creation and other factors which impact local populations and prosperity.

Before rushing to close their doors, countries and citizens should think about whether what they’re doing is bad for competitiveness and hence bad for business.
ARTICLE 3

STRICT US IMMIGRATION POLICIES CONTRIBUTE TO HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT
BY: RT
SOURCE:
August 4, 2012

As the US struggles with prolonged high unemployment, the country’s immigration service is protecting American jobs by forcing foreign workers out of the country. Experts say these policies actually raise – not lower – jobless rates.

Some 720,000 foreign students are currently studying in the US, but this privilege comes at a cost. International students at the university level pay tuition rates around three times higher than in-state students. And after paying tens of thousands of dollars to US colleges, many of these students are forced to return to their native countries, taking their talents and skills with them.

It’s called ‘reverse brain drain,’ and it’s a hotly debated subject, especially since some of the most successful global entrepreneurs hail from countries outside the United States.

“We found out recently that about half of the top 50 venture-funded companies had at least one immigrant founder. So if you keep such people out, you have less job creation and less innovation in the US,” Executive Director of the National Foundation for American Policy Stuart Anderson told RT.

Others argue that the topic isn’t quite so straightforward. Those who support a more flexible US immigration policy are frequently opposed by Americans who fear that a more liberal approach to work visas would take jobs away from deserving domestic workers.

The controversial H1-B visa allows highly skilled immigrants to work for technology companies in the US. Supporters of the visa program argue that the US has a dire shortage of engineering talent. Those who oppose the H1-B visa claim the engineering shortage simply doesn’t exist, and that America should close its doors to foreign workers.
Yet refusing visas to talented entrepreneurs also prevents new jobs from being created in the first place, leaving many wondering whether America’s policies are harming the country’s workers, and the economy.

‘When one door closes, another opens’

The founder of Snapdeal.com, India’s largest e-commerce company, knows the struggles of the US visa process better than most.

After completing an Ivy League education, Kunal Bahl’s visa application was rejected by the US immigration department. Bahl was forced to return home, taking his business plans with him. Upon arriving in India, he opened Snapdeal.com, which became a near-overnight success.

“We have 16 million users. One out of six internet users [in India] is registered on Snapdeal, and this is growing by one million per month. By the end of the year, we’ll reach 25 million users. We are the highest trafficked e-commerce site in India,” Bahl told RT.

Bahl’s success allowed him to hire 300 employees based in India. If Bahl had been allowed to stay in America after graduating, US citizens would be occupying those positions.

His case is far from unusual – Indian nationals are the immigrant group hardest-hit by American visa denials.

Eleven percent of Indian applicants were denied work visas last year, while only around 3 percent of applicants from countries like Germany and the UK were rejected for the same type of visa, RT correspondent Priya Sridhar reports.

Current US law limits any country from being granted more than 7 percent of the total number of green cards issued each year. This generally results in a higher rejection rate for residents of larger countries like India and China.

Many argue that this policy is discriminatory, since it limits applicants based on their nationality, not their merits. In an editorial in Forbes, immigration policy analyst David Bier called the policy “senseless and unjust.”

As America closes its doors to foreign entrepreneurs, it just might be worsening its own unemployment crisis.
NEW RUSSIAN MIGRATION LAWBoosts Islamic State Recruitment in Tajikistan

BY: Karoun Demirjian
SOURCE: The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/russian-migration-law-tajikistan-islamic-state-recruits
July 14, 2015

When American-trained Tajik special forces commander Colonel Gumurod Khalimov defected to Islamic State (Isis) a few weeks ago, he issued a clarion call for hundreds of thousands of his countrymen working as migrant labourers in Russia to follow him.

“Stop serving the infidels,” he said in an online video, prompting the Tajik government to block access to Facebook, YouTube and other social networks for several days.

But local migrants and religious advocates say that if Isis is recruiting from Tajikistan, it is driven more by economics than ideology.

Since the start of the year, a new Russian migration law has required foreign workers from countries outside the Eurasian Economic Union customs bloc to pass Russian language and history tests, acquire expensive permits and pay steep monthly fees to keep the jobs they have been doing for years. The law has had a particularly severe effect on Tajikistan, where remittances account for almost half the national income. The World Bank expects them to drop by 23% this year.

Meanwhile, Isis recruiters are at the ready, offering large sums of cash to desperate, unemployed workers to go to fight in Syria. And many – given the lack of options in the poorest of the former Soviet republics – are answering the call.

“If our citizens who are without work, who are young, who don’t have a salary, who don’t have a life, are offered a golden city and told ‘you can earn more money, you can improve your conditions’ – naturally he would feel that he would be much better off going to fight in Syria,” Mavjudah Azizova, of the International Organisation for Migration’s Tajikistan office, said in an interview recently. “More than 400 of our citizens are in Syria, officially, and it could be even more. Those are just the ones we know by name.”
Dilshod Saliev, 22, returned from Moscow to Sarband in south-western Tajikistan about three months ago, after he was forced to leave his job at a furniture factory. He says that if Islamist recruiters came to him offering cash to join their ranks, he wouldn’t take the money. But he knows someone who did, just a month ago – and understands why others would.

“Of course there is a threat of extremism – many people in this situation are very desperate,” he said. “They need land, they need to build their houses, they have children, schools to pay for; they need money so badly that they could follow some groups that would offer them money. So there is a risk.”

Saliev says his former boss withheld his pay and replaced Tajik employees who complained with Ukrainians, who have been flooding the Russian job market since war in eastern Ukraine began displacing the local population.

Before the new Russian labour policy, Saliev’s salary – roughly 29,000 roubles a month, or about $900 before the rouble crashed – let him pay for his wedding and his sister’s wedding and even to buy a plot of land. But now, if Saliev wants to go back to Russia, he would have to save every penny of the approximately $100 per month he makes doing odd construction jobs for at least half a year to pay for the new work permits, because a high school dropout such as him can’t pass the entry test without a prep course or paying a bribe. His salary isn’t even enough to support his wife and two children, he says.

The extent of the Central Asian recruiting threat is unclear. Russian diplomats warn of a steady supply of fighters running from Central Asia to extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, and there is ample anecdotal evidence of Tajiks – from the security officer to university students and migrant workers – joining Isis. But western academics studying the region say such warnings are overblown – bolstered perhaps by national agendas and global security concerns. The idea that Islamist extremist groups would seek Tajiks as foot soldiers in their armed quest for a caliphate is both obvious and paradoxical.

Tajikistan has a long, largely unsecured border with Afghanistan that could be as open to extremist transit as it has been to an illicit regional drug trade.

But Tajikistan’s religious Muslim population exists under the fiercely secular authoritarian government of Emomali Rahmon, which banned
face veils for women and children under age 18 attending mosques, shut down scores of religious schools and is reported to support forced shavings of men with beards, to keep the religious look off the streets of Tajikistan.

The anti-Islamist mood has become so strong that the Islamic Revival party – an opposition group that has participated in Tajik politics since the country’s post-Soviet civil war – complains the government is scapegoating them instead of addressing the socioeconomic roots of instability they say are fuelling rising interest in Islamic State.

“If the authorities could make it possible for people to work and live, I do not think there would be any radical groups – people would not want to join,” said Hikmatullo Saifullozoda, head of the analytical centre of the Islamic Revival party, which he described as “a shield against spreading radicalism” that disproportionately targets “very vulnerable” migrant labourers.

“If you can’t find work, if you can’t provide for yourself, and you live in this system with a high level of corruption – a person will either become a criminal or go to support Islamic State,” said Oinihol Bobonazarova, a well-known human rights activist who ran as the main opposition candidate for president a few years ago.

“In most cases, those people that go are very poor. It’s not about religion, it’s about poverty.”

Bobonazarova likened Tajikistan’s dependence on the Russian market to a “hostage situation”. In fact, Russia’s role in perpetuating the instability roiling Tajikistan goes deeper than this migration law: it’s in Russia, experts say, where Tajiks and other Central Asian migrants are exposed to extremist ideologies, in the mosques they attend alongside Chechens and other Muslim communities with closer ties to Islamic State.

“If migrants are going to Syria from Russia, nobody will know how they got there,” said Muzaffar Olimov, director of the SHARQ Research Centre in Dushanbe, who said that while radicalised Tajiks may head to Syria, they won’t inspire widespread social support for religious fundamentalist groups or an Arab spring-style social uprising on the home front. “For that you would need different circumstances, different facts – people just don’t want to go for that here.”

Still, in a country where the average age is under 24, salaries are a fraction of what they are in Russia and nearly 20% of young men who
stay in-country are unemployed, growing instability is a real concern that almost certainly can’t be settled domestically.

“Tajiks basically rely on God and the hope that everything will be OK,” said Muhammed Ziyo, 26, a former migrant worker who now peddles his skills as an electrician and technician in Dushanbe’s informal day labour markets.

Ziyo returned two years ago, when his father became ill. Then his son was born. Now he would go back to Russia, but with five mouths to feed on about $250 a month – if he’s lucky enough to get work – he could never afford the new permits.

Ziyo sees only one way out: if Tajikistan joins Russia’s customs union, all barriers to work eligibility would be lifted. More than 70% of the country favours that option, according to Olimov. But for now, Ziyo plans to just hang on and avoid any high-paying offers for high-risk rewards.

“I believe in God, and so I just say thanks to God, even if I find only a crust of bread in a day,” he said. “That’s how I avoid this temptation, even if life is not easy.”
ARTICLE 5

JAPAN’S IMMIGRATION PHOBIA
BY: John West
SOURCE: Asian Century Institute
February 22, 2016

Japan has always been culturally averse to immigration due to the notions of cultural uniqueness and homogeneity that pervade Japanese thinking. This is ironical in many ways.

For example, following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, large numbers of Japanese emigrated to Hawaii, California, Latin America and elsewhere in the Pacific area. Even today, some Japanese retirees are migrating to countries like the Philippines and Thailand. And Japan does have ethnic minorities like the Ainu, the Ryukyuan, and the Burakumin. Japan’s growing immigrant population
The issue of immigration to Japan has become a topic of lively debate over the past couple of decades, especially since Japan's working age population began declining in 1995. This is the result of a long period of fertility below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.

Japan’s foreign population has indeed increased from about 1% of total in 1990 to 2% today. These migrants come mainly from China, Korea and more recently South East Asia.

Many Koreans are descendants of people who were moved during the period of Japanese colonisation of Korea from 1910 to 1945. Some immigrants are descendants of Japanese emigrants to Latin America, and who have a right to return. An "internship" program employs about 170,000 migrants, mainly from China and Vietnam.

Japan also has about 140,000 international university students (60% come from China) who can work 28 hours a week. Marriage migration has become an important source of migrants. And some women, especially from the Philippines, also migrate through "entertainer visas". The strong demand for foreign workers means that Japan has a significant number of illegal migrants who are overstaying their visas.

Economic partnership agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines have provisions for the acceptance of registered nurses and nursing
care workers. But their Japanese language requirements are so strict that very few people have been able to avail themselves of this immigration avenue.

Nevertheless, Japan has the lowest foreign population, as a share of total, of all the advanced OECD countries, except for Mexico. Its immigration policies remain highly restrictive for lower skilled migration. And while Japan is very welcoming to highly skilled migration, the country has had difficulty attracting such migrants, as they tend to be more attracted to Asia’s more international cities of Hong Kong and Singapore. Japan ranked a mere 48th out of 60 countries in its “attractiveness to foreign-born highly skilled professionals” in a survey by Switzerland’s International Institute for Management Development.

Japan’s labor shortages
With the continued decline in Japan’s working age population, the country is now beset with labor shortages which are adversely affecting economic growth, and are inhibiting the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal stimulus policies, as the International Monetary Fund has argued. According to a study by Daiwa Institute of Research, there would be labor shortages in the 340,000-660,000 range during 2015-16, which are cutting GDP by some 2%.

A survey by the Manpower Group, points to 81% of Japanese firms having difficulties in filling jobs in 2014. This is the highest of all the countries surveyed, with Japan’s labour shortages increasing significantly over the past decade. Japan’s labour shortages are most pronounced in areas like construction, health care, home service and long-term care, and restaurants. This is challenging for the reconstruction following the 2011 triple disaster, and also for the preparation for the 2020 Olympic Games.

The corporate sector and some commentators have been arguing for greater openness to immigration, and the government’s “Abenomics” programme does include a policy to increase the utilisation of foreign workers. The government has implemented some measures for highly skilled foreign professionals and to lengthen the stay of “internship” migrants from three to five years. But these responses remain very modest.

Looking ahead, there is little end in sight to Japan’s labour shortage problems. Under one scenario, the Japanese government is projecting the labour force to shrink from 66.3 million in 2010 to 56.8 million in 2030, with economic growth remaining near zero. Japan needs a comprehensive immigration policy.
The Japanese government needs to abandon its ad hoc, reactive approach to immigration and elaborate a comprehensive immigration policy which should be an integral part of the country’s medium-term growth strategy. Immigration is often an important complement to other policy issues.

For example, “womenomics”, enhancing women’s participation and advancement in the economy, is a key and potentially powerful element of the Abenomics programme. Indeed, the OECD has estimated that if the female labor participation rate were to converge to those of men by 2030, this could lift GDP by almost 20%.

However, reaping these potential benefits is greatly constrained by restrictions on immigration of home service and care workers that make it difficult for Japanese women to combine work and family life. The massive cost of Japan’s ageing population is also exacerbated by the lack of care workers, due to immigration restrictions.

Entrepreneurship and innovation are two other areas where Japan’s performance has been relatively weak, and where immigration can contribute. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Japan’s entrepreneurial activity has been very low since GEM started collecting data in 1999, and in 2014 was the second lowest of the more than 100 countries surveyed (coming just before Surinam). And as the OECD laments, "Low rates of firm creation and exit reflect a lack of economic dynamism in the business sector". As many studies have shown, well-managed immigration can be a powerful source of entrepreneurship and innovation. Where would Silicon Valley be without its immigrants?

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ambitious target of doubling the level of direct investment in Japan from the woefully low 4% of GDP could also be facilitated by greater openness to immigration. Many immigrants bring a stock of assets to invest, and can be useful workers for international companies requiring bilingual staff. The stock of foreign direct investment in Japan is very much lower than for the US (19%) or for Germany (29%). Even North Korea’s stock of inward FDI, which represents 12% of GDP, is much higher than Japan’s.

Japan’s ageing and declining population is having profound impacts on the country’s agricultural and regional economies. With the average age of Japanese farmers being 68, and Japanese youth having little interest in the agricultural sector, immigration could be a saviour for the sector. Immigrants could also help revive many of Japan’s rural regions which are now dying and deserted from population decline.
Like affluent youth all over the world, young Japanese have no liking for “3D” jobs (the dirty, difficult and dangerous). Migrants are the only people willing to do such jobs.

At a time when Japan is seeking to court more diplomatic friends in the Asian region, in the context of geopolitical rivalries, one important friendship gesture would be greater openness to immigration. It should also entail reforming the bogus internship programme, which is a disguised scheme for cheap labour, and is subject to widespread abuses like forced labour and confinement.

Japan could also enhance its position as a responsible stakeholder in the international community by reforming its closed-door refugee policy. Few nations are as financially generous as Japan in financing international relief efforts for persons displaced by war, civil strife, and natural disasters. Japan is the fourth-largest donor to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, with a grant of $182 million in 2014.

Conversely, few nations are as miserly as Japan in providing physical asylum to refugees. In 2014, the Immigration Bureau only approved 11 of the 5000 applications (0.2% of total) for refugee status. In sharp contrast, the US granted refugee status to 30% of cases in 2013, Germany to 22% in 2014, and the UK to 37% in 2014. As UN High Commissioner for Refugees said “The numbers [of acceptance] are quite low. I think that there is a reasonable presumption that the system is too rigid and too restrictive.”

Given its concern about the cultural compatibility of potential migrants, Japan could make greater efforts to facilitate the integration of its international students into the economy, following their graduation. After a few years study, they are usually at ease with the Japanese language and cultural customs. Less than 10% of Japan’s international students seek working visas. Targeting international students as potential immigrants might also improve the attractiveness of Japan as an international education destination.

The Japanese government could also integrate into its development cooperation policies education and training programmes in countries likely to supply future migrants. These programmes could teach Japanese language, laws, customs and culture, and provide the basis for obtaining a ‘green card’. The government could seek to court some of the 600,000 people worldwide who take the Japanese Language Proficiency Test each year.
Changing public attitudes towards immigration

Is it realistic to think of Japan opening up to immigration as a new potential source of economic growth?

After all, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and many parts of the government remain steadfastly against having an immigration policy, citing the social problems experienced in Europe with large scale immigration. In an address to the UN, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said “I would say that before accepting immigrants or refugees, we need to have more activities by women, elderly people and we must raise our birth rate. There are many things that we should do before accepting immigrants.”

But government ministers like Shigeru Ishiba and Taro Kono have recently spoken out in favour of increased immigration. And an Asahi Shimbun survey does show that Japanese public opinion may be changing. The majority support a more open immigration policy with the number of those willing to accept foreigners who want to permanently settle doubling over the last five years. In this new poll, 51 percent of Japanese respondents said they support Japan accepting foreigners who want to settle, while 34 percent were opposed to expanding immigration.

For Japan, revitalising its economy is imperative. Already, Japan’s potential GDP growth rate has fallen from over 3% in the early 1990s to only ½% today, according to the Bank of Japan. The population is slated to fall from its current 127 million to 87 million in 2060, when 40% of the population would be 65 or older.

Without more serious efforts, there is a risk of Japan simply withering away under the weight of poor demographics and the burden of massive public debt, and increasing its vulnerability to the growing fragility of its regional security environment. A well-designed immigration strategy could play an important role in revitalizing the economy and also society.
ARTICLE 6

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON SENDER COUNTRIES
BY: World Finance
April 28, 2015

The economics of migration dominates much political debate in the West. How does migration impact the sender countries of the developing world?

Now is an age of globalisation. The parochialism of the nation-state is giving way to the global village. At the same time, never before have borders been so heavily policed; walls keeping prospective citizens out so high; camps for detaining the transient so large. Yet for all these barriers to entry and hazards to navigate, the number of migrants, globally, continues to grow. In 2013 247 million people, according to the World Bank, were global migrants, while 2015 is estimated to see this number rise to 250 million.

From the borderlands of the American South West, to nearly every nation in Europe, and down to the South African cities of Durban and Johannesburg, anti-immigration sentiment is on the rise; the economic benefits of migration in migrant-destination countries hotly debated. While the impact in destination countries in areas such as North America and Western Europe is a constantly recurring debate, the economic impact – be it positive or negative – also weighs heavily upon sender nations.

Sending money south

For sender countries, one of the chief benefits of global migration is remittance payments from the departed. Migrants that have secured a job abroad often send parts of their wages to their families still residing in their home country. While the growth of remittance payments has slowed in 2015, their total global value still stands at $440bn. Further, remittance payments, due to positive predictions for the global economy, are set to pick up growth rates in 2016 and reach the value of $479bn by 2017.
These large transfers of money, from the more prosperous developed world to the poorer developing, are often seen as key to the latter’s economic development. As Professor Andrew Geddes, an expert in international migration at the University of Sheffield notes, remittance payments “are a private flow that is far more significant in size, scale and impact than state to state development aid. They are private flows that put decisions to consume, invest etc in the hands of migrants and their families.” As the Philippines-based newspaper the Inquirer reported in 2013, remittance payments “sent home by overseas Filipinos now reach about $2bn per month, oiling the country’s robust consumer spending.” In Nigeria, remittance payments are said to contribute up to five percent of GDP.

Likewise, remittance payments can also be used as collateral for migrants to purchase houses in the sender country. As one report by Migration Policy notes, “The idea is to develop legal and financial procedures that permit migrants to purchase a house for themselves or their families without having to return to their country of origin. The remittances are used to pay off the loan, while the house serves as loan collateral.”

Others are less optimistic about the benefits of remittance payments. In the 19th century, the ability of impoverished populations to migrate was also viewed as an “escape valve” that dissipated social discontent. The contemporary sociologist Werner Sombart observed that the migration opportunities offered by the American West prevented social conflict in the US. At the turn of the twentieth century the German state and many newly independent Balkan states also saw immigration as providing a safety valve for relieving social discontent within their own countries.

According to Raúl Delgado Wise and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias, both of the Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico, remittance payments are providing a similar function. Remittance is being relied upon by governments, in absence of meaningful economic development, as “a support for social stability.” In relation to sender countries such as Mexico, El Salvador, Philippines, and Morocco, Wise and Covarrubias write that “the chief benefit of remittance payments are used by states as, in that they mitigate poverty and marginalisation while offering an escape valve from the constraints of local, regional, and national labour markets.”

The problem with such reliance upon remittance, say Wise and Covarrubias, is that it is “in reality a perversion of the idea of development that offers no prospects for the future.” Poverty is merely
being relieved through remittances, with the support of governments and international agencies, rather than fundamentally addressing poverty through economic development policies.

Unlocking funds

Beyond cash transfers for consumer spending – as economically stimulating as they may or may not be – remittance payments also have the potential to unlock much-needed funds for developing countries. These funds could be used to promote more comprehensive development initiatives. The use of remittance payments has been used in some countries as collateral for international borrowing. As the World Bank notes, the “use of future remittances as collateral – future-flow securitisation of remittances – can lower borrowing costs and lengthen debt maturity. An important element of a future-flow securitisation structure is the creation of a special purpose vehicle offshore to issue the bond and shield it from sovereign interference.” Although up to date figures are not available, in 2008 an additional $20bn had been raised by developing countries using this method.

Global migration from the developing to the developed world also opens up other potential tools for economic development. Migrants in destination countries saving their money are likely to use a deposit account, accruing little interest. This presents a financial opportunity for sender countries, through offering bonds to diaspora populations to raise funds for development.

Typically a migrant saving in a destination country will be earning little to no interest on their savings. Sender countries could offer their countrymen (and women) working abroad the possibility of purchasing a bond “with a face value of $1,000, say, carrying a three to four percent interest rate and five year maturity,” the World Bank suggests. Interest rates paid to those holding bonds would be lower than that of sovereign bonds issues, as the interest benchmark rate, determined by that of a deposit account, would be lower than the LIBOR benchmark rate.

Some countries have had success with diaspora bonds, such as India and Israel, with the former using it to support balance of payments and the latter to fund education and infrastructure projects. Migration offers the opportunity for developing countries to carry this out. For example, Bangladesh has around $9.5bn in diaspora savings, while Haitian and Afghani diaspora populations both own around $4.5bn in savings. The finance accrued from a diaspora bond could help finance much needed infrastructure projects in these countries. As the World Bank reports,
globally diaspora bonds “could be used to mobilise a fraction – say, one-tenth – of the annual diaspora saving, that is, over $50bn, for financing development projects.” Nigeria, with its estimated 17.5 million migrants abroad, is presently in the process of readying diaspora bonds.

The American Uncle

In 19th century Germany there was the cultural – and actual individual for some – figure of the American Uncle. Following the 1848 revolutions, many Germans headed across the Atlantic, and made their fortunes in the US. Now as before, some migrants are able to take advantage of the opportunities offered in destination countries and make it rich. Many such migrants often engage in philanthropy, sending money back to their home countries or towns in the hopes of alleviating poverty for the less fortunate.

According to the World Bank there are “[t]wo relatively organised forms of diaspora philanthropic engagement is through Home Town Associations (HTAs) and diaspora foundations,” as well as the use of private channels. “Some governments,” the World Bank continues, “have attempted to channel collective remittances through HTAs by offering matching funds. Among the best-known matching fund schemes is Mexico’s 3-for-1 program, under which the local, state, and federal governments all contribute $1 each for every $1 of remittances received through a HTA overseas.”

These philanthropic endeavours are mostly used in rural areas to provide vital services such as healthcare, electricity or education. However, the private nature of philanthropy often means that it “is difficult to assess whether these investments—and the matching grants—have gone to the highest-priority projects or have been diverted from other regions with a great need of assistance from fiscally constrained governments,” says the World Bank. Such philanthropy may provide small, often localised poverty relief and even some economic development. However, the criticism of Wise and Covarrubias of remittance payments also applies here; it is a temporary relief measure in absence of economic development. No economy ever transitioned from third to first world through the patronage of wealthy donors.

Brain drain to Europe

One of the primary economic drawbacks of migration for sender countries is the experience of a brain drain. In the past, migration was primarily the pursuit of the rural poor, dislocated from their traditional economies by modernity, left without many prospect in their home
country. However, the developing world is becoming increasingly educated. The result for sender countries of the developing world is the loss of the most educated (often so at the expense of the state) to other countries, leaving the sender country without vital human capital.

“Potentially, there is a loss known as brain drain if countries invest in skills and training (eg of medical professionals) only for these people to then leave and work in another country,” Professor Geddes says, “although there will be flows back, such as remittances and there may be the eventual return of migrants to their homes possessing more skills and experience.” Others are not optimistic. Professor Leila Simona Talani in her book The Arab Spring in the Global Political Economy, argues that countries such as Tunisia and Egypt are trapped in a vicious cycle of a brain drain and marginalisation in the global economy; both continually reinforcing each other.

According to Talani, “Tunisia is lagging progressively more and more behind in terms of the technological skills necessary to enter new global productive chains. This dramatically reduces the possibility for highly-skilled personnel to find appropriate jobs in the country.” The option taken by these highly-skilled workers is often to realise the potentials of their university education in France, Germany or Italy, reinforcing Tunisia’s lag and marginalisation.

The same phenomena exists in Egypt says Talani, writing in her book that “the marginalisation of Egypt and of the MENA region from the global political economy reduces the possibilities of employing highly skilled personnel in the country, thus further adding to its marginalisation. The country seems to have entered a vicious circle which is becoming more and more difficult to break.”

Whether or not migration brings a net economic benefit to the sender countries is hard to determine. Migration offers many benefits to sender countries through the transfer of funds from those abroad through remittance, however the danger is that this becomes a substitute for economic development; with the sender countries reliant upon cash transfers but without any real economic foundation to build upon. Ideas such as diaspora bonds or using the future-flow of remittance payments to secure debt may help cash strapped sending countries with much needed funds – which if used correctly, such as to build infrastructure – could stimulate economic development.
ARTICLE 7

STRICT IMMIGRATION LAWS ‘SAVE DENMARK BILLIONS’
BY: Anna Reimann
SOURCE: Spiegel Online
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putting-a-price-on-
foreigners-strict-immigration-laws-save-denmark-billions-a-759716.html
April 29, 2011

Denmark's strict immigration laws have saved the country billions in benefits, a government report has claimed. The Integration Ministry report has now led to calls among right-wing populists to clamp down further on immigrants to increase the savings.

The extremely strict laws have dramatically reduced the flow of people into Denmark in recent years, and many government figures are delighted with the outcome. “Now that we can see that it does matter who comes into the country, I have no scruples in further restricting those who one can suspect will be a burden on Denmark,” the center-right liberal integration minister, Søren Pind, told the Jyllands Posten newspaper.

Pind was talking after the ministry's report -- initiated by the right-wing populist Danish People's Party (DPP) -- came to the conclusion that by tightening immigration laws, Denmark has saved €6.7 billion ($10 billion) over the last 10 years, money which otherwise would supposedly have been spent on social benefits or housing. According to the figures, migrants from non-Western countries who did manage to come to Denmark have cost the state €2.3 billion, while those from the West have actually contributed €295 million to government coffers.

'Restrictions Pay Off'

The report has led to jubilation among right-wing politicians: "We now have it in black and white that restrictions (on immigrants) pay off," said DPP finance spokesman Kristian Thulesen Dahl. The DPP will almost certainly exploit the figures in future negotiations over the Danish economy.

But the report has sparked outrage from opposition parties like the centrist Social Liberal Party, which dismissed it as undignified and discriminatory. The party’s integration spokeswoman, Marianne Jelved, said: "A certain group of people is being denounced and being blamed
for our deficit, being made into whipping boys." She added: "We cannot classify people depending on their value to the economy. That is degrading in a democracy that has a basic value of equality."

Still, the announcement has not come as surprise. The right-wing populist DPP, which has been working with the ruling center-right coalition government of Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen since 2001, has in the past made its aims very clear: a complete halt to immigration into Denmark from non-Western countries. "A Somali who is no good for anything, that is simply not acceptable," said DPP leader Pia Kjærgaard. Similarly, center-right liberal Prime Minister Rasmussen has also said anyone who would be a burden on Denmark is not welcome in the country.

Right-wing populists have even demanded a ban on satellite dishes so that TV stations like al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya cannot be beamed into Danish living rooms. There have also been suggestions to exempt migrants from the minimum wage -- supposedly to make it easier for foreigners to gain access to the labor market.

The small Scandinavian country already has the strictest immigration and asylum laws in Europe. For example, foreign couples are only allowed to marry if both partners are at least 24 years old. The number of asylum seekers and relatives of immigrants seeking entry into Denmark dropped by more than two-thirds within nine years as a result of the tough laws.

A Decisive Issue in Denmark

But things may soon get pushed even further. Elections are due to be held this fall, and the ruling parties apparently want to put forward even stricter rules, driven by the xenophobic rhetoric of the right-wing populists. In polls, the approval ratings of more liberal politicians have fallen, and the opposition center-left Social Democrats have promised not to change current immigration laws if they win the election.

Immigration will always be a big issue in Denmark -- almost 10 percent of Denmark's 5.5 million people are migrants -- and the issue was a decisive one in the last election, in 2007.

In November, the government agreed to stricter laws and made the entry of immigrants' spouses more difficult. Only those who collect enough "points" may come to Denmark in the future -- with points being determined by factors such as academic qualifications and proof of language proficiency. In addition, the equivalent of €13,000 must be deposited with the state in the form of a bank guarantee to cover any
future public assistance. Socially deprived areas with a disproportionately high number of immigrants will be subject in future to a so-called "ghetto strategy" designed to prevent high concentrations of foreigners in public housing areas. Migrants will be assigned housing, and three-year-old children who do not speak Danish well enough will be required to attend state child care.

Some immigrants have already turned their back on Denmark voluntarily. Increasing numbers of Somalis are moving away, especially to the UK, the Jyllands Posten reported on Thursday, because of discrimination.
China’s place in the global migration order has been transformed by three decades of rapid economic development. Policies to reform and open the country initiated in 1978 accelerated Chinese emigration and internal migration towards the industrialized coast. While these flows remain important, another trend has gained momentum: Increasing numbers of foreigners are making their way to China.

Migration to China is exceptionally diverse. With a robust economy, welcoming universities, and low living costs, the country attracts people from all parts of the world. Relatively lenient visa policies have allowed entry to migrants from a range of backgrounds. The passage of new legislation in 2012, however, marked a step towards stricter immigration control.

Rising Entries Prompt Reform

For nearly three decades, migration to China was regulated by the 1985 Law of Administration of Entrance and Exit of Foreigners (Waiguoren Rujing Chujing Guanli Fa). Though largely known as a country of emigration, since the law’s enactment, there has been a 35-fold increase in the number of foreign entries (long- and short-term) into China, including rising numbers of tourists, students, and business travelers. There were approximately 594,000 immigrants living in China in 2010, according to the national census carried out that year, the first to record the number of resident immigrants. The top five countries of origin were the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, Japan, Burma, and Vietnam. Even as immigration is rising, immigrants represent a tiny fraction of the country’s population of 1.35 billion.

China’s economic benefits from immigration are indisputable. International traders help products from the export-oriented manufacturing sector reach their markets abroad. Tourists have become an important source of income. Foreign student fees contribute
substantially to Chinese university budgets. And foreign-recruited skilled workers help push China further up the global value chain.

At the same time, the social consequences of immigration have become a public and political source of concern. In the 1990s, anxieties about “low-quality” immigrants not contributing to China’s modernization were mainly focused on large-scale irregular immigration from North Korea and Vietnam. With the economic crisis of 2008 hitting much of the globe, however, the accusation is now directed at migrants from around the world, including Europe and North America. More recently, protests and riots by African immigrants in China (an estimated population of 20,000 to 60,000), have also contributed to a fear of immigration as a threat to social stability. High-profile official campaigns to crack down on “illegal foreigners” have been launched in China’s major cities.

In 2004, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) created a working group to overhaul the 1985 immigration law. The group was tasked with balancing the need to promote economic development and protect national security and social stability. The introduction of more comprehensive immigration legislation was considered part of general political reforms towards greater rule of law in a “socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics.”

The ensuing eight-year process involved several legislative bodies and stakeholders at the national and local level. Seminars were organized to discuss Western immigration laws and their transferability to the Chinese context. In June 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the new Exit and Entry Administration Law (Chujing Rujing Guanli Fa). The law came into force in July 2013. Its first article embodies the tension between managing the challenges and opportunities of immigration: “In order to regulate exit/entry administration, safeguard the sovereignty, security and social order of the People’s Republic of China, and promote foreign exchanges and opening to the outside world, this Law is hereby formulated.”

An underlying distinction in the new law between desirable and undesirable immigrants mirrors that found in the immigration policies of many Western countries. This distinction is seen in China as a tool for modernization. “The important thing for China is to set standards for foreigners in terms of educational attainment, occupation, salary and other aspects, just as developed countries do,” a legislator stated upon passing the law.

Combating the “Three Illegals”
The 2012 law is the first comprehensive legal framework for regulating foreigners’ visas, residence, and rights in China. The overall thrust is to combat illegal entry, residence, or work in China—the so-called “three illegals” (san fei).

The law raised the penalties for all immigration offenses. The fine for overstaying a visa, previously RMB 5,000 (USD $800), was doubled to RMB 10,000. The stipulated detention time for the same offense, to be served instead of paying the fine, increased from three to ten days to five to 15 days, and up to 60 days “if the case is complicated.” An order to leave China can be given along with the fine or detention.

The treatment of immigrants in practice, however, does not always conform to these stipulations. Both before and after the law’s passage, unauthorized migrants unable to pay for their own repatriation were detained for months and even years. In Guangdong province, a main destination for foreigners in China, the typical experience in 2014 for unauthorized African immigrants who could pay for their own repatriation was three months’ incarceration. Immigrants have interpreted the practice as an informal way to add to the punishment for overstaying.

The 2012 Exit-Entry Law also targets those assisting unauthorized migrants. A RMB 5,000 fine may be levied on individuals providing fake documentation or qualifications to ineligible foreigners. Employers of unauthorized migrants can be charged RMB 10,000, while the fine for those working illegally is RMB 20,000 (USD $3,200). Under Article 45, anyone who becomes aware of foreigners who have entered, reside, or are employed illegally in China should notify the local public security bureau. Some local governments have gone further in providing incentives to citizens for fighting the “three illegals.” In Guangdong, provincial provisions stipulate that informers can be rewarded.

Some of the tools used to control foreigners were initially designed to manage China’s own population, such as the household registration system (hukou). Foreigners must register their rented housing at the local police station within 24 hours of arrival. The local authorities thus have information about where foreigners live and when their visas expire. This is used to enforce immigration legislation. The 2012 law imposes a RMB 2,000 (USD $320) penalty on those who fail to register their rental housing. Housing can only be registered with the consent of the landlord, who may retract this approval if, for example, the tenant owes rent. The government deliberately manipulates the residential
pattern of immigrants by declining to register housing for foreigners in certain areas.

The Chinese decision to task employers, landlords, and the general public with monitoring the immigration status of foreigners represents a de facto decentralization of immigration law enforcement. It resembles attempted initiatives taken elsewhere in the world—such as state-level legislation in Arizona, United States, ultimately struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court—to penalize people who shelter, employ, and assist unauthorized migrants.

Easing Restrictions

While the general trend is towards stricter monitoring and control, the 2012 law makes it easier for certain groups to enter and stay in China.

Welcoming Co-Ethnics Back: Overseas Chinese

Certain aspects of the new law were designed to strengthen ties with the 5.3 million China-born people and approximately 33 million ethnic Chinese living outside China, Hong Kong, and Macao. Many among this diaspora have skills needed by China as it upgrades its economy. The law granted Chinese citizens overseas without hukou extended rights to buy property and benefit from social, medical, and educational services.

Furthermore, two new visa categories (Q1 and Q2) were introduced for people with family ties to China, who no longer have to fit into other visa categories in order to enter and stay in China. Importantly, for transnational families, foreign spouses can now stay in China on a Q1 visa rather than a tourist visa, although it does not permit working in China.

In a Global Competition for Talent: Foreign Professionals

One of China’s long-term objectives is to attract more skilled foreigners without prior ties to China. The 2012 law introduced a new visa category to facilitate the immigration of high-level professionals and a fast-track mechanism to process them. However, there are no standardized procedures or qualification criteria, and the visa is currently issued on an ad hoc basis.

Employment visas are intended for professionals in sectors facing skills scarcity. It remains to be seen whether this requirement will be enforced more strictly in the future, given the high number of Chinese university graduates unable to find relevant jobs.
Honoring International Commitments: Refugees

Though China has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, the 1985 Exit-Entry Law did not mention the right to apply for asylum. A small but growing number of asylum seekers have found shelter in China, itself a country of origin for many international asylum applicants. The 2012 Exit-Entry Law includes provisions for persons to apply for refugee status and remain in the country during the screening of their applications.

The Chinese government is not yet capable of assessing asylum claims, and the Beijing office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out refugee status determination on China’s behalf. The office has a growing caseload of intercontinental migrants seeking asylum, but its access to refugees from China’s neighboring countries is restricted. As of August 2014, the total population of concern in China, including refugees and asylum seekers, was 301,478, according to UNHCR estimates. Of those, 300,895 were from neighboring Indochinese countries, a long-standing refugee population. Somalia accounted for the second largest group, with 202 individuals.

No Way Out: Migrants Trapped in China

The new law has failed to introduce measures to manage one of China’s greatest immigration challenges: migrants trapped in the country because their visas have expired. Applications for exit visas must be supported by housing registrations, but registering housing requires valid travel documents. Consequently, migrants are often forced to buy forged documents in order to leave China, or must wait for the police to arrest, fine, and repatriate them. Both are costly ways to exit.

Among the unauthorized migrants in China are victims of trafficking. There is little knowledge about life in China in many African countries; traffickers have exploited this ignorance to entice women, especially East Africans, into going there. In China the women are exposed to debt bondage, forced prostitution, and deprivation of freedom. The Chinese government ratified the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol in December 2009. However, the 2012 Exit-Entry Law does not contain provisions for trafficking victims or conform to international standards in this area.

Uneven Enforcement

The 2012 Exit-Entry Law was created with the aim of providing a more coherent framework for managing immigration, but immigration is still
dealt with in greatly diverse ways across the country. This is partly because of the inconsistent and often vague nature of the law. Much is left to be specified through provincial regulations or ad hoc actions by law enforcement officers. Provinces may pass more restrictive provisions than those at the national level without facing constitutional disputes.

Government funding structures undermine uniform implementation of immigration legislation. Local governments fund the budgets for police departments in charge of day-to-day enforcement of immigration policy. With incomplete national and provincial regulations for reference, the police take orders from local authorities with their own political priorities.

The case of greater Guangzhou provides a strong example. While Guangzhou and the neighboring district, Foshan, work under the same national and provincial rules, their implementation of the immigration law has differed greatly. Unauthorized immigrants started moving from Guangzhou to Foshan ten years ago to escape strict controls on visa and housing registration in Guangzhou, as the Foshan police were known for being more forgiving with foreigners. African and Filipino migrants who had overstayed their visas also approached the police in Foshan rather than Guangzhou for exit visas. Eventually, the administrative and social burdens placed on Foshan by the influx of unauthorized migrants instigated stricter practices in the domains of visa checks, rental housing, and exit visas. By the end of 2014, many of the unauthorized had moved away from Foshan to districts where the laws were more leniently interpreted and enforced.

Future Implications for Migration and Immigrants in China

With less than two years since the new Exit and Entry Administration Law took effect, its full consequences cannot be assessed. Although resembling Western policies in some respects, the 2012 law is also distinctly Chinese in some of its content and modes of implementation. Most significantly, it leaves much to be decided at the local level, where politicians as well as law enforcement agents are prone to be influenced by public opinion. Currently, popular sentiments are hardening against immigration, suggesting that it may become increasingly difficult for many foreigners to enter and stay in China. Whether China can deter the migrants deemed unwanted while nurturing a welcoming environment for those viewed as desirable remains to be seen.
ARTICLE 9

WELFARE USE BY IMMIGRANT AND NATIVE HOUSEHOLD
BY: Steven A. Camarota
SOURCE: Center for Immigration Studies
http://cis.org/Welfare-Use-Immigrant-Native-Households
September 2015

This study is the first in recent years to examine immigrant (legal and illegal) and native welfare use using the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). While its complexity makes it difficult to use, the survey is widely regarded as providing the most accurate picture of welfare participation. The SIPP shows immigrant households use welfare at significantly higher rates than native households, even higher than indicated by other Census surveys.

- In 2012, 51 percent of households headed by an immigrant (legal or illegal) reported that they used at least one welfare program during the year, compared to 30 percent of native households. Welfare in this study includes Medicaid and cash, food, and housing programs.

- Welfare use is high for both new arrivals and well-established immigrants. Of households headed by immigrants who have been in the country for more than two decades, 48 percent access welfare.

- No single program explains immigrants' higher overall welfare use. For example, not counting subsidized school lunch, welfare use is still 46 percent for immigrants and 28 percent for natives. Not counting Medicaid, welfare use is 44 percent for immigrants and 26 percent for natives.

- Immigrant households have much higher use of food programs (40 percent vs. 22 percent for natives) and Medicaid (42 percent vs. 23 percent). Immigrant use of cash programs is somewhat higher than natives (12 percent vs. 10 percent) and use of housing programs is similar to natives.

- Welfare use varies among immigrant groups. Households headed by immigrants from Central America and Mexico (73 percent), the Caribbean (51 percent), and Africa (48 percent) have the highest
overall welfare use. Those from East Asia (32 percent), Europe (26 percent), and South Asia (17 percent) have the lowest.

- Many immigrants struggle to support their children, and a large share of welfare is received on behalf of U.S.-born children. However, even immigrant households without children have significantly higher welfare use than native households without children — 30 percent vs. 20 percent.

- The welfare system is designed to help low-income workers, especially those with children, and this describes many immigrant households. In 2012, 51 percent of immigrant households with one or more workers accessed one or more welfare programs, as did 28 percent of working native households.

- The large share of immigrants with low levels of education and resulting low incomes partly explains their high use rates. In 2012, 76 percent of households headed by an immigrant who had not graduated high school used one or more welfare programs, as did 63 percent of households headed by an immigrant with only a high school education.

- The high rates of immigrant welfare use are not entirely explained by their lower education levels. Households headed by college-educated immigrants have significantly higher welfare use than households headed by college-educated natives — 26 percent vs. 13 percent.

- In the four top immigrant-receiving states, use of welfare by immigrant households is significantly higher than that of native households: California (55 percent vs. 30 percent), New York (59 percent vs. 33 percent), Texas (57 percent vs. 34 percent), and Florida (42 percent vs. 28 percent).

- Illegal immigrants are included in the SIPP. In a forthcoming report, we will estimate welfare use for immigrants by legal status. However, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of immigrant households using welfare are headed by legal immigrants.

- Most new legal immigrants are barred from welfare programs when they first arrive, and illegal immigrants are barred as well. But the ban applies to only some programs; most legal immigrants have been in the country long enough to qualify for at least some programs and the bar often does not apply to children; states often provide welfare to new immigrants on their own;
naturalizing makes immigrants eligible for all programs; and, most important, immigrants (including illegal immigrants) can receive benefits on behalf of their U.S.-born children who are awarded U.S. citizenship at birth.

- The heavy use of welfare by less-educated immigrants has three important policy implications: 1) prior research indicates that illegal immigrants are overwhelmingly less-educated, so allowing them to stay in the country creates significant welfare costs; 2) by admitting large numbers of less-educated immigrants to join their relatives, the legal immigration system brings in many immigrants who are likely to access the welfare system; and 3) proposals to allow in more less-educated immigrants to fill low-wage jobs would create significant welfare costs.
The African Union (AU) has launched a pan-African passport. The idea behind the initiative is that the free movement of people will help create jobs and stimulate economic activity. This, in turn, would increase intra-African trade, boosting economic growth. The organisation's intention is that by 2018 the passport will be distributed to all African citizens.

The AU envisages the issuing of a biometric passport, or electronic passport, which would use contactless smart-card technology. It was chosen instead of a traditional passport because there is a smaller chance of fraud.

The concept has been strongly backed by a number of countries, such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, Senegal and Rwanda. All have eased or lifted visa requirements for people travelling from other African countries.

But a number of insurmountable obstacles stand between the vision of a pan-African passport and it becoming a reality. I believe they are too big to overcome, particularly in the short time-frame the AU has given itself.

The big obstacles

The first is that many African countries lack the basic measures to roll out the initiative. For instance, they do not have access to the biometric systems needed to register the passports. Currently only 13 of the 54 AU members offer biometric passports. Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana and Tunisia, for example, do not have them.

Second, there is already resistance to migration. This comes in the form of pre-existing visa barriers to other African nationals. For example, Equatorial Guinea, the country with the highest gross domestic product per capita in Africa, requires that citizens from the other 53 sovereign
African states acquire a visa when visiting. Other African countries with the same restrictions include the Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Sudan. These would need to be repealed before a pan-African passport could be adopted.

These countries have already shown their aversion to the adoption of the African passport, with the clear intent not to open borders to possible indiscriminate migration.

Third, some countries are averse to allowing entry to more migrants due to high unemployment rates. In South Africa there is a widespread perception that foreigners are taking too many local jobs. This has led to xenophobic attacks, most recently in 2015 and 2016.

The country may therefore also be reluctant to adopt the passport. This, however, would run counter to national legislation. South Africa's green paper on international migration, issued by the South African Department of Home Affairs on the adoption of the African passport affirms that:

*South Africa fully supports the vision of an Africa where its citizens can move more freely across national borders, where intra-Africa trade is encouraged and there is greater integration and development of the African continent. The current status is untenable.*

Fourth, despite sub-regional agreements allowing for the freedom of movement of people, some African countries continue to adopt derogatory policies that make them “less free”, citing security concerns. For example, while Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have agreed to the adoption of a single East African tourist visa, Burundi and Tanzania have bailed out citing reasons of national security.

Domestically, some countries are also strengthening their refugee and migration policies. They have done so on the grounds of security concerns. A well-known example is Kenya’s decision to close Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the country.

Impact on refugees

What impact would an African passport have on the status of refugees and internally displaced people?

It is still not clear how refugee policies would be affected. At present policies have been mostly at the discretion of domestic institutions. The
question will therefore be: how much sovereignty will African states be prepared to surrender to adopt a common refugee policy?

Until now only 19 African countries have implemented an essential legal instrument for the protection of migrants, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. This shows that countries are more inclined to determine their own migration policies.

Added to this is the fact that, theoretically, the phenomenon of refugees would disappear if borders no longer existed. This is because no administrative “foreign border” would be crossed. Instead “refugees” would be replaced by an immense number of internally displaced persons.

If this were to be the case, the 2009 Kampala Convention would need to be revised. This is the AU treaty that establishes state responsibilities for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons.

Insurmountable challenges

I believe it would be very difficult to overcome all these challenges because of the very short amount of time the AU has given itself.

Recent history shows that, as a general policy, national sovereignty breaches individual rights in most African countries. This includes the freedom of movement. This is done in the name of keeping the country secure.

The idea of adopting a unique e-passport for Africans is certainly praiseworthy. But, in my opinion, there are presently still too many social, cultural and, above all, economic issues that will make the use of this passport impractical.

Personally, I would rather start to strengthen existing sub-regional agreements. These have the scope to integrate more deeply the different countries that have signed them.
ARTICLE 11

MIGRATION AND FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND
Families that stay behind when a member migrates do not clearly benefit
BY: Sylvie Démurger
SOURCE: IZA World of Labor
http://wol.iza.org/articles/migration-and-families-left-behind/long
April 2015

Elevator pitch
About a billion people worldwide live and work outside their country of birth or outside their region of birth within their own country. Labor migration is conventionally viewed as economically benefiting the family members who are left behind through remittances. However, splitting up families in this way may also have multiple adverse effects on education, health, labor supply response, and social status for family members who do not migrate. Identifying the causal impact of migration on those who are left behind remains a challenging empirical question with inconclusive evidence.
**Key findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Pros</strong></th>
<th><strong>Cons</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ The migration of a family member brings additional income through remittances, which can support household consumption and investment.</td>
<td>- The migration of an economically active family member places a heavier burden on those who stay behind, who must make up for the lost employment and spend more time on household chores.</td>
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<td>+ This income effect can reduce the need for child labor and increase children’s schooling, notably for girls in developing countries.</td>
<td>- The absence of the main caregiver can increase children’s probability of dropping out of school and delay school progression.</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Remittances can improve families’ sanitation, health care, and nutrition and fill in for missing formal health insurance in the short term.</td>
<td>- Disrupted family life can lead to poor diets and increased psychological problems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Remittances can enable remaining family members to engage in higher-risk, higher-return productive activities.</td>
<td>- Migration may reduce incentives for education when perceived future returns to education are low because of expectations of migration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Where most migrants are men, the bargaining power of women who stay behind may be strengthened.</td>
<td>- Migration can reduce labor force participation for family members left behind, especially for women.</td>
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**Author's main message**
The effect of a family member’s migration on those who stay behind can be either positive or negative, depending on individual circumstances. Although remittances are a potentially important means of easing family budget constraints and alleviating poverty, the most vulnerable populations may be hurt by a family member’s migration. Policymakers need to consider the specific circumstances behind the migration and of the family members in the home country. Support systems for these families may need to be bolstered to help them cope with any detrimental impacts of migration, especially its effect on education and human capital accumulation.

**Motivation**
The number of people migrating from their country of origin or from one region to another within it has been growing dramatically in recent decades. The UN estimates that about 232 million people live and work outside their country of birth and that 763 million people live and work outside their region of birth within their home country. Since 2000, the international migrant stock has been growing faster than the total world population, and it now accounts for 3.2% of the world population (Figure 1).
International migrants and internal migrants together account for one in seven people worldwide. These migrants do not always move with their entire family. More often, they leave the rest of their family behind: their spouse, children, and parents. Rigid migration policies, uncertain living conditions in the destination country or region, and the high cost of migration are among the reasons why many people migrate alone. In China, individuals who have migrated from rural areas to cities have left behind an estimated 61 million children, 47 million wives, and 45 million elderly relatives [1]. In the Philippines, one of the largest sources of migrant laborers worldwide, around nine million children are growing up without at least one of their parents because of migration.

The impact of migration on sending communities, especially on family members left behind, has long been debated. On the one hand, labor migration is viewed as economically benefiting the family in the home country through financial transfers. Remittances can ease liquidity and budget constraints and thereby improve households' long-term welfare through investments in health care and education. On the other hand, many studies have pointed out the social cost that migration imposes on families left behind. In particular, the physical absence of the migrant may have multiple adverse effects on family members' education, health, labor supply response, and social status. Thus, identifying the
impact of migration on family members who remain is an open empirical question with inconclusive evidence.

Discussion of pros and cons
The main channels: Remittances and household time allocation
When people migrate for work, the groups that are most likely to be left behind are women, children, and the elderly. Two primary mechanisms associated with migration can affect those staying behind. Most important, the migration of a family member usually brings additional income to the family through remittances and can therefore ease the budget constraint for family members in the home country or region. In particular, the income effect can enable larger investments in education and health care, create new opportunities to invest in businesses, and raise the reservation wage (the lowest wage at which a person is willing to accept a job) of family members who remain behind. Yet migration also entails the absence of an economically active family member and the loss of that member’s time inputs to both market and household production. In particular, this absence may translate into disrupted personal care for dependent family members, including children and the elderly, and a greater burden of responsibility for work and household chores among family members. The forgone market and household production (including both labor force participation and care) may be substantial and may outweigh the gains from remittances. Since these two mechanisms work in opposite directions, the impact of migration on family members left behind can only be determined empirically.

Another dimension to consider when assessing the relationship between migration and the family left behind is the duration of migration [2]. The expected impact is ambiguous in both the short term and the long term. In the short term, migration may have a disruptive effect on the family because of reduced inputs to market and household production. As migration is costly and does not necessarily lead to immediate employment at destination, it may even translate into reduced income for the family that has to finance the migrant. In the long term, the forgone market and household production may be compensated for by a reallocation of labor among family members who stay behind. Yet, whether financial transfers rise or fall with the duration of migration is uncertain. Long-term migrants are likely to earn a higher income and as a consequence may be able to afford to send larger remittances. However, their commitment to their family may weaken over time, leading to reduced financial transfers.

Thus the impact of migration on the family in the home country or community is complex, multi-channeled, and context-dependent. It ultimately depends on who migrates and who is left behind (gender and
age are key dimensions here) and on the duration of migration. Given the complexity of the relationship, empirical studies are needed to clarify a net impact that is ambiguous a priori.

Measuring the causal impact of migration is challenging. Empirical work is made possible by the availability of household survey data that account for internal and international migration flows. The standard research strategy is to compare outcomes of interest for migrant-sending households and for non-migrant-sending households. But there are important methodological problems that may limit the scope of the findings and to some extent explain their inconclusiveness. The main difficulty arises from the fact that migration is a choice variable, which plagues the empirical literature with important selection and reverse-causality problems.

Selection bias, which complicates analyses of migration, can arise for a number of reasons: individuals (or households) are not randomly selected but self-select into migration; they choose how many family members will migrate; they choose when to migrate and for how long (including whether to return); and they choose whether to send remittances and how much to send. In this context, omitted variables that are correlated with both the migration decision and its outcomes for family members who are left behind may cause endogeneity problems and bias estimates of the impact of migration on the family left behind [2]. For instance, wealthier households may be able to afford to send family members abroad for work and still have enough money to pay for the education or health care expenses of the rest of the family. In that case, comparing migrant-sending households with non-migrant-sending households may capture differences in wealth rather than the effect of migration. In addition, endogeneity may also result from reverse causalities between some of the outcomes of interest and migration. Because parental health can be part of the migration cost, having parents in poor health may outweigh the economic benefit of migration and may therefore reduce the likelihood that their children will migrate. A careful identification strategy that takes into account this possible reverse causality is required in order to estimate the causal impact of children’s migration on parental health.

Researchers have applied various methods to correct for multiple selection and reverse causality biases in observational data. Typical methods include the use of instrumental variables (variables that are correlated with the migration decision but uncorrelated with the outcome of interest outside of its impact on migration), selection-correction models, natural experiments, and matching methods (which
assume that selection into migration depends on observable characteristics only and match migrants with comparable non-migrants based on these observable characteristics).

Finding valid instruments is a major difficulty, and while using experimental data is a promising approach, such data are rarely available and may be very costly to construct [3]. Nonetheless, a few recent studies have taken advantage of data on policy experiments in New Zealand, which introduced immigration-visa lotteries for selecting applicants from Samoa and Tonga. The studies then compared households with a lottery winner (with migrants) with households with a lottery loser (without migrants) [2], [4], [5]. This strategy solves the problem of self-selection into migration because households in both groups had members who were willing to migrate. In the same vein, a study used the US diversity visa lottery to estimate the impact of migration to the US on the consumption and health of household members staying in Ethiopia.

Evidence of the impacts on education
The impact of migration on the school attainment and education performance of children left behind is the most documented dimension of the link between migration and the family left behind. One difficulty in measuring this impact is that parental migration is likely to be correlated with unobserved factors that may also explain the education outcomes of the children. For instance, if migrants are positively selected (more skilled and educated than the average person in the home country or community), households with migrants may have stronger preferences for investment in education, in which case the analysis may be identifying the effect of education preferences rather than of migration.

There are several main channels where a parent’s migration may affect children’s education. On the positive side, remittances sent back home can ease the household budget constraint by making more resources available. As a direct consequence, families have less need of child labor, which frees up children’s time for school. On the negative side, the disruption to family life as a result of a parent’s migration, especially the lack of a parent’s care and supervision, might negatively affect children’s school performance.

A third, complementary channel is the possibility of a child’s own (future) migration, which might either encourage or discourage a child’s education, depending on perceived returns to education in prospective jobs. Studies for Mexico have pointed out that families with higher probabilities of migrating to the US invest less in education, an outcome
that is attributed to the low return to Mexican education in the US labor market.

Finally, a parent’s migration may lead to a redistribution of decision-making and responsibilities within the household, which can affect child schooling, either because the new decision-maker (for example, the other parent or an older child) cares more or less about investment in education than the migrating parent or because the redistribution of roles puts more pressure on children to help in the household.

The literature offers inconclusive evidence on whether migration has a net positive or net negative impact on education outcomes of children who are left behind [1], [6]. Most empirical studies highlight heterogeneous impacts that depend on the gender, age, and sibling birth order of the children left behind, as well as on the gender of the parent migrant and whether one or both parents are absent.

Focusing on the short-term direct effect of remittances on household decisions, some studies provide evidence of a positive impact of remittances on schooling in the Philippines [7] and in Mexico [8]. Other studies that have assessed the negative consequences of parental absence have found that parental migration increases the probability of a child’s dropping out of school and of delayed school progression and has a negative impact on children’s school performance.

Evidence for Mexico also reveals gender-based differences [9]. Parental migration significantly increases educational attainment for girls, lowers the probability of boys completing junior high school and of boys and girls completing high school, and, when the migrant was a caregiver, raises the probability that boys and girls will have academic difficulties. For girls, especially in developing countries, the income effect appears to dominate: remittances, by easing family budget constraints, open up greater education opportunities for girls, who are more likely to be deprived of educational investments when family finances are constrained. For older boys, however, alternatives to education, particularly their own migration, tend to overcome the income effect and drive boys away from school.

Evidence of the impacts on health
The impact of migration on the health of family members left behind has received relatively little attention. Estimating health effects also faces selection and reverse causality problems. For instance, adult children whose parents are in bad health and in need of care might be less likely to migrate. At the other end of the health spectrum, migrants
may share a genetic predisposition to good health with their children and their parents.

The channels through which migration behavior may affect the health and nutrition status of family members left behind are similar to those highlighted for education. In the long-term, the income effect of remittances may be large if they contribute to better sanitation, improved food habits, and more health-seeking behaviors. In the short-term, migrants may also make up for missing formal health insurance mechanisms by sending larger financial transfers back home when they are needed.

Working in the opposite direction, however, is the household time reallocation necessitated by a migrant’s absence, which may negatively affect the health of family members left behind. Family members may have to take on more housework (including farm work in rural areas), may suffer greater psychological pressure, or may eat more poorly, especially in the case of children, because of the absence of the main caregiver. In rural societies, migration may also disrupt traditional kinship systems and care structures, to the detriment of the most vulnerable groups. And as in the case of education, the relationship between migration and the health status of those who are left behind also differs by gender and age.

A growing literature is analyzing the causal effect of parental migration on children’s health and nutrition. Migration seems to improve the nutritional status of very young children, measured by birth weight, infant mortality rate, or weight-for-age [10]. However, a study that exploits New Zealand’s migration lottery program to capture the causal effect of migration from Tonga finds worse diets and lower height-for-age in the short term among children under the age of 18 who are left behind when a parent migrates compared with children whose parents applied but did not win the migration lottery [5].

Another set of studies, some using careful instrumental variable approaches, has empirically assessed the impact of the migration of adult children on the health of their elderly parents. Again, the evidence is mixed. In both China and Mexico, the migration of adult children has been found to result in lower self-reported health status among elderly parents. In contrast, a study for Moldova finds evidence of a beneficial impact of the migration of adult children on the physical health of elderly family members who stay behind and finds no significant impact on their mental health or cognitive capacity. These findings are attributed mostly to a strong income effect: remittances contribute to a more diversified diet and allow for changes in household time allocation.
toward more leisure and sleep. If anything, the inconclusiveness of the recent empirical literature on the health effects of migration reveals that whether migration is detrimental or beneficial to the health of those who are left behind is deeply context-dependent.

Evidence on the labor supply response to migration
As with education and health, migration affects the labor allocation decisions of the family members left behind through two main channels. First, the availability of remittances may change labor supply responses in potentially competing ways. On the one hand, financial transfers from migrants can enable family members who stay behind to enter riskier, higher-return activities by easing household financial constraints. If this effect dominates, then migration will lead to a diversification of economic activities among family members who are left behind and possibly to increased income from local activities in the long term. On the other hand, the increase in disposable income brought by remittances may dampen the incentives to work of non-migrating family members, in particular if the financial transfers raise the reservation wage of family members and lower the opportunity cost of leisure [11]. In that case, the increase in income from remittances may reduce the labor force participation of family members, and in the long term it may create dependency on income from remittances.

Second, migration results in the loss of the migrant’s local labor, which may strongly constrain the labor supply response of non-migrating members in the short term. In particular, when labor markets are imperfect, as is typically the case in developing countries, family members who are left behind may not be able to hire labor to compensate for the lost contributions from the migrant. In rural areas, this lost labor may force other family members to increase the time devoted to (subsistence) farming.

In addition to these two main channels, migration may also affect a spouse’s labor market participation by affecting productivity in the home. If the inputs of spouses in the home production function are complements, then migration will lower the productivity of the spouse who remains behind; if the inputs are substitutes, the opposite will hold. As is the case for education and health, the net effect of migration on labor supply depends on the relative magnitudes of the remittances-related effect and the lost-labor effect. Moreover, the net effect may vary across different subgroups of people, depending on the age and the gender of the household members, their employment sector, the seasonal or permanent nature of migration, the household’s assets, and on how binding liquidity constraints are for the household [12].
Research on the labor supply responses of family members to international migration consistently finds evidence of decreasing labor force participation of women who are left behind, be they Albanian, Egyptian, Mexican, or Nepalese [11]. The only increase in labor supply comes from an increase in unpaid family work and subsistence work, particularly in rural areas. In rural China, internal migration is found to increase farm work for all family members who remain behind (women, the elderly, and children), and return migration does not seem to reverse these labor allocation changes [12].

Evidence of impacts on intra-family roles and the transfer of norms
A straightforward extension of the analysis of the labor supply responses of family members left behind is to investigate the reallocation of intra-family roles and the possible strengthening of the bargaining power of certain members who stay behind, as this affects decision-making and the control and allocation of resources. In patriarchal societies, where most migrants are men, migration may influence not only the labor supply in communities of origin but also the position of women who remain behind [13]. In Albania, less educated women in households from which men have migrated are more likely than their peers in households without a male migrant to gain access to remunerative employment, which could empower them to make resource-allocation decisions within the household. Changes in intra-family roles can also be observed among siblings: in China, older sisters are found to have a positive influence on their younger siblings in households from which a parent has migrated.

Finally, a recent strand of the literature focuses on the transfer of norms, looking in particular at how political norms and behavior at home change with migration. Migrants may transfer not only financial resources to the family left behind but also political knowledge, preferences, and practices absorbed in their host country. In transition or developing countries, where institutions are weak, the diffusion of political norms through communication between migrants and their family back home has the potential to boost demand for political accountability and promote democracy. Using a voting experiment to capture the individual demand for better governance in Cape Verde, a study provides evidence of a positive impact of the proportion of international migrants in an individual's locality on the demand for political accountability. International migration is also found to affect political behavior and voting: in Mexico and Moldova, there is evidence of a positive impact of migration on votes for opposition parties.

Limitations and gaps
The literature on migration and the family left behind recognizes the difficulty of measuring a causal impact. This is both a clear limitation and a major challenge to researchers. Most studies rely on data from home-country household surveys, making it difficult to overcome the problem of the non-random selection of individuals into migration. Unresolved endogeneity problems are among the reasons why studies report mixed results of the impact of migration on the education, health, and labor supply of family members who stay behind. The recent use of experimental approaches, through policy experiments such as visa lotteries and natural experiments, is leading the way to promising solutions to these difficulties. Collecting such data is particularly challenging, however, and often depends on the willingness of policymakers to share the data with researchers.

There is also a need for better survey data, notably for richer longitudinal data sets that simultaneously survey migrants abroad and sending households. Although studies using such data sets would still not be as good as randomized controlled studies, they would help researchers and policymakers learn more about the mechanisms through which migration affects family members who do not migrate.

Another limitation is that most studies have investigated specific settings, so the results may not be generalizable. In particular, the impact of migration may vary considerably depending on the type of migration and on the source and destination countries analyzed. For instance, the loss of parental supervision and interaction might be much more detrimental for international migration, with long-distance travel and infrequent returns, than for short-distance internal migration.

Another source of cross-study variability may be the family’s income level before migration, which can influence whether the net effects are positive or negative. In particular, for poor households in poor countries the income effect of remittances would be expected to be stronger and more likely to counteract the negative effects associated with the absence of the migrant.

Summary and policy advice
With about one billion international and internal migrants worldwide, the relationship between migration and the family left behind is an important policy question. Labor migration is conventionally viewed as economically benefiting the family left behind. Remittance transfers can ease budget constraints and thereby increase spending on health care and education, improving households’ long-term welfare in the source country. However, the migrant’s absence might also have negative
consequences for non-migrants, be they children, the elderly, or a spouse.

Policymakers need to account for differences in the situations of migrants and their families who stay behind and bolster support systems in education and health care to help families cope with the detrimental effects of migration on the accumulation of human capital. If migration implies lower education or health status or more child labor, the potentially long-term costs of migration need to be mitigated through appropriate home country policies. Population aging is another issue to consider.

Many migrant-sending developing countries have inadequate social safety nets, especially in rural areas. Countries may need to establish supportive institutions that can help families who stay behind adapt to the loss of an economically active member or caregiver through migration. Policy options for developing countries include improving the functioning of labor markets (notably in rural areas, to facilitate the hiring of local labor when a family member migrates), strengthening formal insurance and credit markets, facilitating the transmission of remittances by lowering remitting costs, and increasing access to education and health care. More specifically, ways to mitigate the impact of migration on human capital include offering access to better education locally at primary and secondary school levels, including providing additional tutoring for children left behind, and building social safety nets to provide pensions and affordable health care for the elderly.
IS IMMIGRATION THE ANSWER FOR JAPAN?
A demographic ticking time bomb has the country thinking the previously unthinkable
BY: Stephen R. Nagy
SOURCE: Asia & The Pacific Policy Society
http://www.policyforum.net/immigration-answer-japan/
September 29, 2016

A multi-stream migration policy is being deployed to combat acute labour shortages in sectors of the Japanese economy, but migrant workers won’t be enough to solve the long-term challenges of Japan’s demographic implosion, Stephen R Nagy writes.

On Wednesday 21 September 2016, while in New York for UN meetings, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was quoted as saying “I have absolutely no worries about Japan’s demography” arguing instead that “Japan may be aging. Japan may be losing its population. But these are incentives for us.”

Despite this optimistic viewpoint, the facts about Japan’s demographics and their impact on the economy are clear. According to the Committee for Japan’s Future, Japan’s total labour force will decline to 55 million by 2060, even with the elderly working to 70 years of age. Furthermore, the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in Japan projects that an elderly population that teeters on 40 per cent of the total population will heavily burden the remaining workforce. These labour shortages will result in decreased economic dynamism, a smaller tax base and emasculate Japan’s ability to promote its national interests both domestically and internationally.

Currently, Japan’s labour shortages are not being felt equally across the economy. Labour shortages are more acutely experienced in particular sectors such as construction, transportation, commerce and the services sector for several reasons. First, these sectors are characterised as blue collar or kitsui, kitainai and kiken (difficult, dirty and dangerous) and have been unattractive to university graduates since at least the 1980s. Second, these jobs are by-and-large low paid and subject to irregular hours compared to full-time, white-collar jobs. Third, in concert with a declining number of new graduates entering the workforce, and a relative improvement of the Japanese economy for middle-class workers, the unemployment rate has dropped to 3 per cent.
To combat the labour shortage trend, the Liberal Democratic Party’s special committee on labour force policy has proposed increasing the number of foreign workers while assiduously avoiding any discussion of immigration. The proposal sees myriad migration categories broadly trifurcated into three streams: the highly-skilled foreign professional, non-skilled workers, and targeted migration streams. In the highly-skilled foreign professionals stream, migrants who work in international firms, set up innovative businesses and invest in Japan are generally welcome. Their entrance into the country is facilitated and they are encouraged to adopt permanent residency through various migration schemes. Abe has even decreased the wait period from five years to less than three years for certain categories of legal foreign residents wishing to apply for permanent residency.

Targeted migration schemes are generally oriented towards occupations such as artists, teachers and other areas in which native Japanese people would be unsuited or where there is a shortage of workers, such as in healthcare. Their migration status can be renewed indefinitely or in some cases, such as with healthcare providers from the Philippines and Indonesia, they can move from being a secondary healthcare provider on a three-year contract to being registered nurses in Japan after passing the national qualification examination that is conducted in Japanese. To date, retention of health care providers has been very low, both because of the exam but also as a result of workplace integration challenges.

In the non-skilled stream, migrants work as trainees in the services sector in part-time jobs while studying at Japanese universities and colleges.

Importantly, these migration categories ensure that migrants do not take jobs away from middle-class Japanese. They ensure that the migration status is temporary for non-skilled workers and that positions in those sectors of the economy with the greatest labour shortages are filled. In short, temporary migration schemes have been at the centre of the labour shortage debate as a way to target sectors of the economy that are unattractive to average Japanese workers.

This strategy may be able to mitigate labour shortages in sensitive sectors while the government attempts to mobilise more workers through increasing the age of retirement and by so-called ‘womenomics’, the Abe administration’s plan to increase the representation of women in the workplace, management positions and leadership roles. A crucial part of this approach to deal with labour
shortages is policies to increase the productivity of Japanese workers through structural change, technology and a more open economy.

Long-term, these approaches may not be enough to fully mitigate the challenges of Japan’s demographic conundrum. Even the benefits accrued from increasing the birth rate per family to two to three children would not stem Japan’s demographic decline or remedy labour shortages. Prominent immigration thinkers, such as former Tokyo Immigration Bureau Chief Sakanaka Hidenori, are instead left to ponder the unthinkable - a future where immigrants are accepted at a level equivalent to 10 per cent of the Japanese population.

Sakanaka’s vision of an immigration nation in which migrant workers contribute to Japan’s demographic, economic and cultural renaissance, although praiseworthy, is as unrealistic as Abe’s comments in New York were insincere. Japan’s demography is quite clearly a concern, regardless of whether or not the government is willing to admit it. Immigration will not be the ultimate answer to solving Japan’s urgent labour shortages.

Dealing with the much greater challenge of Japan’s demographic implosion will require an immigration strategy with Japanese characteristics that has appropriate and robust integration policies to maximise the human capital that comes to Japan but also minimises intercultural and interethnic friction in a country with little ethnic and cultural diversity in mainstream society.
ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

1. The Ethics of Migration and Immigration
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/more/resources/the-ethics-of-migration-and-immigration/

2. Europe’s having a distress sale on visas
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/business/europes-having-a-distress-sale-on-visas.html?_r=0

3. Coming to America: The Benefits of Open Immigration
https://fee.org/articles/coming-to-america-the-benefits-of-open-immigration/

4. Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.3.83


6. Immigration is Good, Immigration is Bad, Migration IS (A Fact)

7. Immigration lessons for the U.S. from around the world

8. The World’s Worst Immigration Laws

9. Theresa May's rules on immigration are a disturbing sign of the country we'd become under her leadership
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-mays-rules-on-immigration-are-a-disturbing-sign-of-the-country-wed-become-under-her-a7119436.html

10. New visa rules for Jamaicans in immigration crackdown